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INTRODUCTION
This case study of urban water and sanitation in Honduras focuses on the perplexing phenomenon of low
level equilibrium (LLE). It first seeks to characterize LLE in terms of sector performance and to show how
it is propitiated by flawed arrangements for sectoral governance, organization of service delivery and
regulation. It then turns to the question: why is it so difficult to escape from LLE? To this end, it analyses
the failure of recent reform efforts, using political economy techniques. 
Section I presents performance indicators for the Servicio Nacional de Agua y Alcantarillado (SANAA)
and for municipal providers, and argues that poor performance of each is rooted in their exposure to
political capture and in the lack of adequate regulation,rather than in their levels of centralization or
decentralization. In support of this thesis, it presents econometric evidence on the credibility of different
sorts of service provider, using willingness to pay data from a recent nationwide survey, which suggests
that public providers lack credibility and are more exposed to rent seeking behavior than private providers.
It then makes a financial analysis of SANAA, which shows that it could quickly become self financing if it
reached reasonable goals for cost effectiveness and tariff effort, and shows that the welfare gains from
doing this would be very large indeed. The section concludes that the case for reform is overwhelming, but
that the political task of organizing reform is a considerable one.
Section II focuses on the political economy of reform. It traces the history of the failed Water and
Sanitation Sector Structural Adjustment Credit, which was supported by the World Bank and the IADB
during 1994-96. A stakeholder analysis shows how the proponents of reform failed to mobilize the potential
sources of support and the government itself was divided, while opponents exploited weaknesses in the
proposal to mobilize opposition. Two weaknesses were particularly damaging. In the first place, the reform
proposal made a central principle of municipalization, but failed to address the poor performance and low
credibility of existing municipal systems. A review is made of recent efforts at municipalization in
Honduras, concluding that the strategy is feasible, but is not a panacea for all the sector’s ills. There is also
a need to develop a credible model of municipal water system operation, independent from political
interference. Secondly, the reform proposal did not adequately address the issue of a regulatory guarantee
for users. The paper concludes by showing how these lessons have been incorporated into the reform
strategy, strengthening the prospects for success in the coming years.2
The organization of the water and 
sanitation sector in Honduras
The Servicio Autónomo Nacional de Agua y
Alcantarillado (SANAA) was formed in 1961 as an
autonomous state enterprise, to serve as rector of
the water and sanitation sector, responsible for
service delivery norms and charged with operating
services in all urban communities with populations
above 500. 
The law which created SANAA specified that it would
gradually assume control of all the existing municipal
water and sewerage systems in Honduras. However,
the law stopped short of creating a legal monopoly,
and at present in Honduran towns with populations
of 2,000 or more, there are 74 municipal water
systems (including that of the second city, San
Pedro Sula), compared with 23 SANAA systems. 
Municipal utilities supply around 65% of urban water
connections, covering some 54% of the urban
population, while SANAA supplies 35% of 
connections, covering 29% of the urban population;
the only sewerage system run by SANAA is that of
Tegucigalpa.
In 1990, municipal development legislation
established water and sanitation as municipal
competencies; however, the law which created
SANAA was neither repealed nor reformed, so the
existing statutes are contradictory. 
I WATER AND SANITATION IN HONDURAS: A CASE STUDY IN LOW
LEVEL EQUILIBRIUM
1.  The performance of the sector
This section reviews the performance of SANAA and of municipal operators of water and sanitation
systems. It shows that the sector as a whole is in a parlous state, characterized by stagnation of coverage,
poor service quality and low cost recovery.
    
a) Service coverage
The performance of the water and sanitation sector
over the last 20 years has not been good. Coverage
of piped potable water services in the urban sector
has stagnated since 1973, at just over 80% (table
1); the water networks have expanded only fast
enough to keep abreast of population growth. In
contrast, in the rural areas (communities under 500
inhabitants), coverage of piped water has grown
sharply, from 21% in 1973 to 40% in 1993, but is
still very low. Including non-piped sources, such as
wells, some 53% of rural dwellers were estimated
to have access to potable water in 1993. 
Within these totals, SANAA is directly responsible
for only 23% of all connections, covering just 14%
of the population of Honduras (table 2).  However,
additionally, SANAA was involved in the
construction of rural systems supplying water to an
estimated 440,000 people, now administered by
Juntas de Agua (Water Commissions).
Only 29% of the urban population is covered by
SANAA (table 2). Municipalities are responsible
for 65% of urban connections, which supply around
54% of the urban population. The following
sections review the performance of the metropolitan
and non-metropolitan systems under SANAA and
municipal management.3
Table 1
Honduras: Water and sanitation coverage
Water Sanitation
Piped  Total  Sewerage Total inc. latrines
1973 1988 1993 1988 1993 1988 1993 1988 1993
Millions of people covered
Urban 0.76 1.40 2.05 1.51 2.22 0.93 1.24 1.54 2.25
Rural 0.41 0.97 1.09 1.12 1.45 0.20 0.14 0.95 1.23
National 1.17 2.38 3.12 2.64 3.64 1.15 1.30 2.51 3.43
Percentage of population covered
Urban 81% 80% 83% 86% 90% 53% 50% 88% 91%
Rural 21% 39% 40% 45% 53% 8% 5% 38% 45%
National 43% 56% 60% 62% 70% 27% 25% 59% 66%
Source: OPS, OMS (1993) and our calculations
Table 2
Population with coverage by type of provider, 1993
Persons, mn % of population % of connections
Urban 2.05 83% 100%
SANAA 0.71 29% 35%
Municipal 1.34 54% 65%
Rural 1.09 40% 100%
SANAA 0.02 1% 2%
Other/1 1.08 39% 98%
National 3.12 60% 100%
SANAA 0.73 14% 23%
Municipal 1.34 26% 43%
Other/1 1.05 20% 34%
Source: calculated from SANAA and OPS data
Note: 1/ Many of the rural systems were constructed by SANAA but then handed over to Juntas de Agua.
SANAA estimates that 440,000 persons living in rural areas are covered by such aqueducts.
b) The metropolitan systems
Honduras has two major cities: the capital, Tegucigalpa, in the center of  the country, with a population of
800,000; and the industrial center of San Pedro Sula on the north coast, with a population of just under
500,000. The water and sewerage system of the former is run by SANAA; the latter, by the municipality. 
The Tegucigalpa system dominates SANAA’s operations, accounting for over half of the company’s
140,000 connections. Water coverage in Tegucigalpa, at 85%, is scarcely better than the national urban
average of 83%, and much of that coverage is due to private systems which have grown up to fill the
vacuum left by SANAA. According to SANAA’s commercial cadaster there are 72,000 domestic In Central America, contractual rights to public services are attributions of individuals, not of their property, and are
2
in principle transferable between properties, but not between persons. Public utility companies will not normally extend service
contracts to individuals whose tenure status is contested as this may expose them to legal action on the part of the legal owner of
the property. This contrasts with many countries in South America, where the service is attributable to the property and is
automatically extended to whomsoever occupies the property for the time being, so that tenure is not an issue in extending service
cover to marginal areas.
 The block tariff is a wholesale rate for the sale of water to independent distribution systems, which is set well below
3
the normal commercial tariff, in order to reflect only production costs and not distributional and commercial costs.
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connections in the city; this represents less than half the city’s households. The cadaster is known to be
very inadequate, but even supposing the existence of a further 38,000 illegal or unregistered connections to
the SANAA system, there are still 30% of Tegucigalpa’s dwellings uncovered by the SANAA system
(table 3). 
Table 3
Tegucigalpa: households with domestic connections by type of provider, 1996
No. '000 %
SANAA - cadaster 72.0 46%
SANAA - illegal  38.0 24%
Private networks 24.5 16%
Without domestic connection 22.5 14%
Total  157.0 100%
Sources:: Based on data from DGEC, for the total number of dwellings and for the % without a connection; from SANAA for the  number of formal
domestic  users in the cadaster; SANAA for the number of marginal barrio users in private systems which receive water from SANAA; and  Walker
and  Ordoñez (1995) for margnal barrio users of private systems with independent supply. The estimate for illegal connections to the SANAA system
is then calculated as a residual. SANAA’s own estimate of illegal connections is much lower, at 15,000. 
This reflects SANAA’s failure to expand services to the marginal barrios, in the main located on high
ground, to which it is relatively costly to deliver water supplies, due to the need for pumping stations. The
unresolved tenure status of many of these settlements also creates problems for their formal incorporation
to the public service.  About a third of these dwellings have piped water from private distribution systems
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administered by barrio committees. Some have their own wells; others receive water from SANAA’s
network, either illicitly or on the basis of the block tariff . 
3
Many bilateral lenders and NGOs support the development of marginal barrio water systems; most notably,
UNICEF has a project with SANAA to finance the construction of distribution systems in such barrios.
However, the marginal barrio systems normally offer an inferior service. Those with their own wells tend to
have poor water quality, with high salinity. Those whose water is supplied “in block” by SANAA often
face an infrequent service and low pressure. Meanwhile, some 22,500 dwellings - almost 15% of the city’s
total - are altogether without piped water. 
SANAA’s failure to expand coverage is rooted in a poor cost performance and a weak tariff effort. The
metropolitan system of Tegucigalpa has an estimated 13.6 staff per 1,000 connections - at least three times This is our  estimate, including a share of SANAA’s central administrative employment in proportion to the number
4
of connections in the city. Estimates for SANAA’s staffing levels vary considerably, in part due to the practice of including many
employees on the payrolls of investment projects, which are not consolidated into the company’s accounts. Our estimate for
Tegucigalpa is derived from data on labor costs, and is probably conservative. The overall number of SANAA employees per
thousand connections was estimated in January 1995 at 14 .7, which would imply a higher ratio for Tegucigalpa.
 During 1997 SANAA has made some headway in negotiations with the union to increase flexibility and reduce staffing
5
levels. However, few redundancies have been implemented. In January 1997 SANAA had total staff of 1,809, which is 13 per 1,000
connections, compared with 1,936 a year earlier (13.8).
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the necessary level.  These high staffing levels are attributable above all to a rigid collective agreement
4
which prevents multi-tasking.  Detailed data for SANAA’s cost structure (tables 4 and 5) show that the
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main problems are rooted in labor costs in Tegucigalpa and in the central administration. Labor costs per
connection in Tegucigalpa in 1993 stood at  L.140 per year, almost double the L.77 incurred in the rest of
the country (table 4). Additionally, there is a very large labor cost in the central administration,
representing 17% of SANAA’s total costs (table 5). 
Table 4
Annual costs per connection, 1993 /1
Tegucigalpa Other Total/2
systems
Lps. Lps. Lps. US$ /3
Labor costs 140 77 181 26.6
Energy 61 87 74 10.9
Chemicals 87 6 49 7.3
Depreciation and provisions 0 0 74 10.8
Other operating costs 17 12 35 5.2
Total 305 181 414 60.8
Notes:  1/ Excludes debt interest, which is absorbed by central government.
            2/ Including the costs of central administration 
            3/ Exchange rate 6.8
Source: Aquagest, 1995 and our calculations
Table 5
SANAA's cost structure, 1993 /1
Central Admin. Tegucigalpa Other Total
systems
Labor costs 17% 18% 9% 44%
Energy 0% 8% 10% 18%
Chemicals 0% 11% 1% 12%
Depreciation and provisions 18% 0% 0% 18%
Other operating costs 5% 2% 1% 8%
Total 40% 39% 20% 100%
Note:   1/ Excludes debt interest, which is absorbed by central government.   
Source: Our calculations from data in Aquagest, 19956
The performance of SANAA’s Tegucigalpa system contrasts poorly in many respects with that of the
División Municipal de Aguas (DIMA) in San Pedro Sula. Formed in 1976, DIMA is part of the
municipality but is administratively independent. In spite of the rapid growth of San Pedro Sula (seven per
cent annually in recent years) it has achieved a coverage of 84%. In 1994, DIMA reported 6.5 employees
per 1,000 connections (table 6).
Table 6
Performance indicators for SANAA's metropolitan system and DIMA, 1994
SANAA- DIMA
Tegucigalpa
Legal individual connections 76,050 59,794
Domestic 71,713 54,064 /1
Other 4,337 5,730
Coverage of legal domestic connections 46% 84% /2
% of all connections with meters 64% 43%
Unaccounted for water 50% 48%
Employees per 1,000 connections 13.6 6.5 /3
Total billings, L. mn. per year 38.6 46.3
Billings per connection, L. per month 42 64
Income from billings, L. mn per year 26 31.4
Collection rate 67% 68%
Income per connection, L.  per month 28 44
Notes
1/  The figure for DIMA includes projects and special connections
2/  % of households in the city legally connected to the system- our estimate
3/  The figure for Tegucigalpa is our estimate, including a share of central administrative
 posts in proportion to connections.
The SANAA system in Tegucigalpa also shows a much weaker income performance, compared with
DIMA. In 1994, average billings per connection stood at L.42 per month in Tegucigalpa and L.64 in San
Pedro Sula, and income per connection was, respectively, L.28 and L.44. In this context, it is striking to
note that in 1994, DIMA’s tariff income (L.31.5 mn) was scarcely below the total tariff income of SANAA
in the whole country (L.35.8 mn).
However, DIMA’s operation is not superior to SANAA’s Tegucigalpa system in all aspects of
performance. DIMA’s metering coverage in 1994 was 43% compared with 64% for Tegucigalpa; its level
of unaccounted for water stood at 48%, scarcely better than Teguciglapa’s 50%; and the collection rates of
the two systems are very similar, with income standing at just under 70% of billings (table 6). And, most
importantly, both have exhibited serious problems with political interference in their management of the
tariff. We return to this point in section I.2 below.  This section is based on a survey carried out in mid 1995 by FUNDEMUN for the World Bank, and on data on municipal
6
performance held by FUNDEMUN and AHMON. We would like to thank FUNDEMUN and the World Bank for allowing us to
use these data sources. However, responsibility for the analysis of the data and for the conclusions presented here, is ours alone.
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c)  The non metropolitan systems
This section presents an analysis of the performance of non-metropolitan SANAA and municipal systems,
undertaken for the present study.  The sample of systems studied is described in table 7. They represent a
6
range of municipal and SANAA-managed systems with broadly matching characteristics in relation to size,
type of water source, poverty levels in the corresponding community and geographical location. The aim of
constructing these two groups was to see if there are any systematic differences in performance which
might be attributed to the system’s administration, rather than to the other factors mentioned.
Table 7
Characteristics of the non metropolitan systems studied
Type of Urban popln Type of Poverty Zone
admon. source/1 index
Choluteca - Sis. Municipal Mun 70,585 P 34 South
Choloma Mun 70,200 P 33 North
Sta.Rosa de Copán Mun 24,356 P 44 West
Olanchito Mun 24,000 G 28 North
Tocoa Mun 18,916 G 26 Atl.coast
El Paraíso Mun 16,613 G 34 Center-east
Nacaome Mun 15,304 P 53 South
Ocotepeque Mun 11,166 G 25 West
Azacualpa Mun 5,100 G 34 West
Choluteca - Sis. SANAA SANAA 70,585 M 34 South
Comayagua SANAA 52,355 G 32 Center-west
Danlí SANAA 38,088 M 40 Center-east
Juticalpa SANAA 28,700 P 39 Center-east
La Entrada SANAA 18,412 M 33 West
Intibucá SANAA 10,088 G 53 Center-west
Sn.Marcos de Colón SANAA 7,966 M 43 South
Note: 1/ G = gravity, P = pumped, M = mixed8
Table 8
Indicators of physical efficiency in non-metropolitan municipal and SANAA systems
No of Water Sewerage Av. Hours % intermit-tent Staff / 1,000
clients cover cover service service connections
Municipal systems
Azacualpa 850 100% 0% 24 0% 2
Choloma 4,771 41% 25% 14 60% 5
Choluteca - Municipal 1,100 n.a. n.a. n.d. n.d. 15
El Paraíso 2,300 83% 33% n.d n.d. 2
Nacaome 1,113 44% 10% 11 100% 6
Olanchito 3,184 53% 54% 6 85% 2
Ocotepeque 1,846 89% n.d. 8 70% 2
Sta.Rosa de Copán 2,254 50% 40% 6 60% 4
Tocoa 2,650 84% 8% 5 95% 4
Totals and averages /1 20,068 68% 24% 11 67% 4
SANAA systems
Comayagua 6,402 73% 69% 17 30% 3
Choluteca - SANAA 6,709 n.a. n.a. n.d. n.d. 8
Danlí 3,344 53% 54% n.d. 90% 2
Intibucá 1,220 73% 30% 18 50% 4
Juticalpa 3,500 73% 59% 8 100% 6
La Entrada 1,968 64% 8% 3 100% 9
San Marcos de Colón 998 75% 26% 6 94% 4
Totals and averages /1 24,141 68% 41% 10 77% 5
Note: 1/ We report the weighted average for employees per 1,000 connections; the other averages are simple. 
Table 8 presents a summary of indicators of physical efficiency for the two groups. While there are
considerable variations within each group, it is striking that the averages are very similar. Each group has
achieved a coverage of only 68% of the urban population. Service frequency averages 11 hours a day in the
municipal systems and 10 in the SANAA systems; 67% of municipal users and 77% of SANAA users face
an intermittent service. And most strikingly of all, both groups have very low levels of staff: four per 1,000
connections for the municipal systems and five for the SANAA systems. This serves once more to underline
the point that overstaffing in SANAA is concentrated in Tegucigalpa.
The similarities between municipal and SANAA suppliers continue when we turn to the indicators of
financial performance, which are presented in table 9. Operating cost per connection averaged L.252 per
year in the municipal group and L.225 in the SANAA group. Labor cost per connection is L.72 in the
municipal group and L.97 in the SANAA group, reflecting the latter’s slightly higher staffing levels; wage
levels appear to be similar between the two groups.9
Table 9
Indicators of financial efficiency in non-metropolitan municipal and SANAA systems, 1994
Operating Labor cost Billings Collect- Income Total Profit Profit as % Policy of % with
cost per per conn. per conn.  ion rate /2 per   profit  per of expenses service meter
conn./1 conn.  /3 conn./3 suspension?
Municipal systems Lps/yr. Lps/yr. Lps/yr. % Lps/yr. Lps/yr. Lps/yr. % %
Azacualpa 27 n.d. n.d. n.d. 23 -3,185 -4 -14% NO 0%
Choloma 437 67 230 68% 157 -1,335,864 -280 -64% YES 0%
Choluteca - Municipal 609 169 250 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. YES n.d.
El Paraíso 148 n.d. n.d. n.d. 120 -63,882 -28 -19% YES 0%
Nacaome 301 47 121 92% 112 -211,000 -190 -63% YES 0%
Olanchito 75 n.d. 68 89% 61 -45,550 -14 -19% NO 0%
Ocotepeque 19 n.d. n.d. n.d. 58 71,266 39 203% NO 0%
Sta.Rosa de Copán 484 46 279 47% 131 -796,429 -353 -73% YES 0%
Tocoa 91 n.d. 189 99% 187 253,154 96 105% NO 0%
Totals and avs. /4 252 72 189 54% 103 -2,801,594 -140 -55% 0%
SANAA systems
Comayagua 96 n.d. 167 89% 149 339,696 53 55% YES 8%
Choluteca - SANAA 272 130 138 98% 136 -916,714 -137 -50% YES n.d.
Danlí 205 49 125 99% 124 -272,066 -81 -40% YES 0%
Intibucá 91 n.d. 150 79% 119 33,703 28 30% YES 0%
Juticalpa 447 80 0 0% 0 -1,564,884 -447 -100% n.a. 0%
La Entrada 203 123 122 87% 122 -159,597 -81 -40% YES 1%
San Marcos de Colón 223 49 157 64% 101 -121,932 -122 -55% YES 0%
Totals and avs. /4 225 97 125 85% 107 -2,661,794 -110 -49% 1%
Notes:  1/ Defined as total expenditure on water and sewerage per water system connection
             2/ System income from water and sewerage as % of billings
             3/ Negative sign indicates a deficit.
            4/ Weighted averages for operating expenditure per connection and for operating profit. Other averages are simple.
The municipal systems studied registered a better tariff effort, billing an average of L.189 per connection,
compared with L.125 for SANAA. However, this is offset by a much lower collection rate, at 55% for the
municipalities, compared with 85% for SANAA. As a result, income per connection is similar between the
two groups (L.103 and L.107 respectively). It is also striking that SANAA registered zero income for the
Juticalpa system, which had recently received significant new investments under the IADB’s Four Cities Data for the SANAA system as a whole for 1994 show billings per connection outside Tegucigalpa of L.134, very close
7
to the L.125 found in our sample. Income per connection was L.148, implying a collection rate of 110%, presumably due to the
charging of arrears. In 1995, the situation changed radically. SANAA billed L.234 per connection, but collected only L.86,  a
collection rate of 37%. It is also striking that although 46% of SANAA’s connections are outside Tegucigalpa, only 22% of billings
and 15% of income arose outside Tegucigalpa in 1995 (Source: SANAA).
 A summary of “good practice” for water sector organization can be found in Foster (1996)
8
 The finance ministry has a directorate responsible for monitoring the performance of public service providers, which
9
publishes reports on performance, but this is not functionally important.  
10
project. As a condition of this investment, the sytem had been transferred from municipal control to
SANAA ownership, but SANAA had not yet organized a commercial system.
7
The data for operating profit show that, on average, the municipal and SANAA non-metropolitan systems
are equally incapable of covering their costs. There is little here to support the hypothesis that the
municipal politicians are in general less prone to under charging than their counterparts in central
government.  In fact, the loss per connection in the municipal systems averages L.140 per year, compared
with L.110 for the SANAA systems. Losses averaged 55% of expenses in the municipal group and 49% in
the SANAA systems. Nevertheless, two of the municipal systems studied, Tocoa and Ocotopeque,
registered a tidy profit, confirming that the possibility also exists of over-charging to fund other projects.
2. How existing arrangements for sectoral governance and regulation contribute to poor
performance
The above analysis places in doubt the thesis that centralization is the sector’s main problem. Both the
centralized SANAA and the decentralized municipal systems exhibit serious weaknesses in their
performance. All the non-metropolitan systems studied appear to be under capitalized and weakly
administered. All are in need of investment resources and technical assistance for both their physical and
organizational development. These findings suggest, rather, that the sector’s poor overall performance is
rooted in the weakness of the existing structure of sectoral governance and regulation, which fails to comply
with most of the internationally established norms.   The following paragraphs detail the main failings.
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a) Sectoral governance and resource allocation
Sectoral strategy is formally a matter for the Ministry of Health, but is effectively delegated to SANAA,
which submits investment proposals for the approval of the planning and finance ministries.   However,
9
SANAA also acts as the single largest service producer, concerned to procure resources for its own projects.
There is a clear conflict of interest between these functions, the more so because capital resources are
supplied as grants (not loans) to SANAA. 
SANAA’s conflict of interest in acting as the strategic planner for the sector and simultaneously, as an
operator of services, is clearly reflected in the skewed distribution of capital resources in its own favor.
Although it supplies only 23% of the connections in Honduras, in the five years 1989-93, SANAA received
66% of Honduras’ water sector investments (table 10). SANAA’s investments were heavily concentrated in
urban projects (73%), with only 27% designated for rural systems. Other agencies important in investment11
finance in the sector are the Ministry of Health, which finances small rural systems (17% of the total), the
Honduran Social Investment Fund, FHIS, which finances both rural systems and urban marginal systems
(8%) and San Pedro Sula’s División Municipal de Aguas (DIMA) (9%).
SANAA’s failure to expand coverage at an adequate rate is rooted rather in its inefficiency in the use of
capital, than in the lack of resources; during 1989-93, the investment assigned to the sector averaged 1.2%
of GDP (table 10). So long as system operators receive capital free of charge as grants from the central
government, and with no other type of accountability mechanism, they cannot be expected to use it
efficiently. It is hardly surprising, for example, that SANAA has no preventative maintenance program, or
that it seeks to disguise a large part of its operating costs as capital expenditures.
Table 10
Honduras water and sanitation sector: distribution of investment resources by agency, 1989-93
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total Total
Lps.mn  
SANAA, Total 86 139 106 119 149 599 66%
  of which, rural 17 28 34 51 38 167 18%
Ministry of Health 17 20 39 44 36 156 17%
DIMA 4 6 8 11 50 79 9%
FHIS 0 8 23 17 23 71 8%
Total, Lps. 107 173 176 190 258 905 100%
Percentage
Total, % of GDP  1.0 1.4 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.2
US$ mn
Total, US$ 38 58 44 33 38 211
Note: Exchange rate 2.8 3.0 4.0 5.8 6.8 n.a.
Source: BID/BIRF/OPS 1994: 19
b) The political control of system operation and the problems of rent seeking
In the second place, the operation of all systems - both SANAA and municipal - is usually subject to
political interference. There is a general belief that water services are a social good which should be
subsidized, and nowhere in Honduras does a water system operate with fully independent finances. The
result is the capture of system rents by users through generalized under charging. However, the benefit to
users is ambiguous, because the corollary  is low quality provision.
The users are not necessarily the main beneficiaries of political interference in the operation of water
systems. In SANAA, the workforce captures a large proportion of system rents through a union organization
which has established very high staffing levels in Tegucigalpa. According to a study commissioned by the
IADB, World Bank and Panamerican Health Organization, the union “has acquired such strength and
predominance in the company that the nomination of technical, administrative and manual staff requires
union approval, as do decisions related to operations and control” (BID/BIRF/OPS, 1994: 14). The co-
administration of the union also contributes to weak commercial performance. In late 1996, SANAA’s
commercial director was replaced at the request of the union when he alleged that union leaders based in his
department had been involved in corrupt practices linked to the assignment of new connections.12
DIMA: a case study in political interference in the tariff decision
From 1984 on, to fund the implementation of a water and sanitation master plan, San Pedro Sula took on debt from the
World Bank and the Commonwealth Development Corporation, with central government guarantees. It also has
outstanding loans from the IADB and USAID. In contrast to the SANAA, DIMA is required by the Government to cover
the debt service from its operating revenues. However, there were long delays in the execution of the projects, due in part
to the political problems of the 1980s, and in part to disputes with principal contractors. As a result, the grace periods on
the loans ran out before the works were completed and could begin to generate income. In addition, the lempira cost of the
dollar-denominated loan service was inflated by currency depreciation from 1990 onwards, while increased reliance on
subterranean sources of water, coupled with increased electricity tariffs, led to a tenfold increase in DIMA’s electricity
bill. 
DIMA needed to double its tariffs to get over the problem - but the  municipality refused to approve such a sharp increase.
As a result, from 1993 onwards, DIMA faced a cash crunch and the central Government had to cover part of the debt
service due to the World Bank, to the tune of US$7 mn between 1993 and 1995. Although tariffs were finally adjusted in
1995, the agreed rise was much less than the necessary 100%, and DIMA hoped to close the gap by shifting away from its
heavy dependence on subterranean sources. These problems have tarnished the image of DIMA as a model for the
municipal administration of water systems and have generated pressure for increased private sector participation in order
to de-politicize tariff setting and provide access to sources of capital.
However, these problems are not limited to SANAA. As seen in the previous section, the non-metropolitan
municipal systems show very similar patterns of tariff effort and service efficiency to those registered by
SANAA’s non metropolitan systems, and in recent years DIMA in San Pedro Sula has also experienced
serious problems with political interference in the tariff decision (see box).  
Econometric evidence on willingness to pay for improved water services, produced for the present study,
provides a measure of the extent to which the politicized control of system operation has undermined the
credibility of public sector providers, both SANAA and municipalities. After controlling for factors such as
existing service cost,  quality, incomes and education, willingness to pay for service improvements should be
positively correlated with the supplier’s credibility as a service provider. The evidence, summarized in the
box below  and detailed in Annex 1, suggests that there is little difference between SANAA and the
municipalities. However, in contrast, willingness to pay for service improvements is much higher among
clients of privately administered systems. 13
The low credibility of public providers undermines users’ willingness to pay
Willingness to pay (WTP) for improved water services might be expected to vary under different conditions of system
administration, for two reasons, each related to the supplier’s credibility:
C WTP for promised service improvements will be a positive function of the confidence that the improved service will
materialize (due to more efficiency and / or less corruption).
C WTP will be an inverse function of the perceived scope for rent seeking. If users believe that they can improve
services through political mechanisms, their WTP for them will be lower.
In a national survey of water demand conducted for SANAA and the World Bank by the authors in 1995 (Walker and
Ordoñez, 1995), households with a piped water connection and with a service inferior to 4 hours per day were asked if they
would be prepared to pay a given price for an improved service, defined as: at least 4 hours a day of potable water at a good
pressure. System administration had a clear impact on the responses. When the system administration is private (via a
Patronato or Junta de Agua), the probability of acceptance is much higher. This effect is especially marked where the
administrator is a Patronato.
Willingness to Pay estimates
Estimates were made of the average Willingness to Pay (WTP) for the improved system for each type of system
administration (Table B1). The analysis shows much higher WTP for an improved water service among the users of
services run by Juntas de Agua and Patronatos in the marginal barrios of Tegucigalpa, compared with both clients of
SANAA and municipal clients. Within the public sector, WTP is higher when the administration is municipal, than when it
is SANAA.
Table B1
Summary of willingness to pay estimates for improved water for different types of administrator
Lps/month SANAA Municipal Patronato Junta de agua
Average willingness to pay for
improved water supply
18.7 21.5 44.8 36.6
These findings give support to the hypotheses that:
C the credibility of municipally administered systems is somewhat higher than that of SANAA
C private, community based administration leads to higher willingness to pay for improved water services, presumably
because the perceived opportunities for rent-seeking are fewer. 
The obvious policy conclusion is that the municipalized water systems should wherever possible be managed by
enterprises, at arms-length from the local government, in order to discourage rent seeking activity by the systems’ clients,
and that private management can be expected to contribute positively to the improvement in system performance.
Note: For details on the econometric analysis reported here, see Annex 1.
c) The regulatory system
The regulation of the sector is badly conceived and weakly implemented. It fails in what should be its central
goal of defending the right of existing and potential users to receive a good quality service at a reasonable
cost. SANAA’s users have no effectively enforceable rights, and municipal services are completely
unregulated.
The principal regulatory agency is the Comisión Nacional Supervisora de Servicios Públicos (CNSSP),
which is responsible for economic regulation. In addition, the Ministries of Environment and Natural
Resources and of Public Health have regulatory responsibilities regarding the use and protection of water
sources, sanitary disposal of waste water, and norms for the quality of piped water supplies.14
CNSSP was established in 1991, when, as part of Honduras’ first Structural Adjustment program, the
IADB and World Bank proposed the creation of a non-political agency to set public services tariffs,
including water, telephones, electricity and transport. Previously, the National Congress set tariffs directly.
The CNSSP was given a general competency to regulate water tariffs. However, this statute stands in direct
conflict with the right of municipal operators to establish their own tariffs, under the municipal legislation of
1990 and 1991 (Articles 84,85 and 86 with their corresponding regulations) (Chama, 1995). In practice,
CNSSP has limited itself to regulating the SANAA tariff.
CNSSP’s structure strongly suggests that it was conceived as a body for the political negotiation of public
service tariffs, rather than as a technical body dedicated to the independent determination of the costs of the
services and equitable mechanisms for their recovery. It is formally autonomous, but in practice is linked to
the Transport Ministry. It has few resources at its disposal, with a budget of $100,000 per year from central
government and just four professional staff, so it depends heavily on the regulated entities for information. 
The fact that the Director has remained unchanged since the Commission began operations, in spite of the
change of government in 1994, suggests some degree of independence from the Executive. However, the
Government has an effective majority on the CNSSP. Its 14 deliberative members include the Minister of
Transport, who chairs and has a casting vote, the Ministers of Finance and of Trade; the four professional
staff of CNSSP (nominated by the executive); two Congressional representatives; two private sector
representatives; two trade union representatives, and one representative of barrio organizations.
The tariff setting process has remained politicized, with long intervals between revisions leading to severe
erosion of SANAA’s real income by inflation. The water tariff was not adjusted for five years between 1990
and 1995.  In 1995, a 100% rise was authorized - but inflation since the previous increase was 159% (table
11). The interval between tariff adjustments was similar when the Congress controlled the tariff directly. 
Table 11
SANAA tariffs and inflation, 1990-95
Domestic tariff, Tegucigalpa
1990 1995  %      
 (Aug) (Sept) increase
Cost of 35 M3, Lps. 14.9 30 101%
IPC 286.5 741.7 159%
The procedures followed for the negotiation of this increase highlight the politicized nature of the process.
Before it was approved, the increase was discussed and informally approved in the Economic Cabinet,
which simultaneously considered requests for tariff increases by the electricity and telephone companies and
decided to give priority to SANAA’s request. It was thought politically untenable that more than one
increase should be approved. The law which established CNSSP (Decreto 85-91) stipulates that tariffs
should be based on “the real economic cost of providing services to each category of consumers” (Article 1)
(Rendón Cano 1995: 8). But in practice, the presumption is that tariffs will be well below this level. The
1995 tariff increase was based on a study of the income needed to cover annual operating costs.
d) Financing the low level equilibrium
The Government finances SANAA’s deficits through a series of subsidies, most of which are not
transparent, including: capital grants for project finance, which in reality contain large elements of In early 1997, the electricity company, ENEE, adopted a policy of charging SANAA for power, and began billing L.2
10
mn approx. monthly. When SANAA fell into arrears, the power supply to the administrative offices was cut and SANAA had to
install a generator. However, it was deemed politically impossible to cut power to the water production and distribution systems.
 The SANAA revenue account presented here is based on the official one, but we have added in a series of expenses
11
which are not normally registered by SANAA, most notably, debt interest.
  This section owes much to a study conducted by Ian Walker together with Raimundo Soto of ILADES, Chile, of the
12
fiscal and equity impacts of the proposed water sector adjustment program in Honduras for the World Bank and IADB in 1995
(Walker, I. and Soto, R. 1995). The assumptions used for this exercise are described in full in Annex 2.
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operational financing; the payment by central government of all interest and amortization on the debt related
to SANAA investments; and the partial non payment of electricity charges and chemicals costs.  In this
10
context, SANAA’s day-to-day financial management problem reduces to the generation of sufficient cash
from tariffs to cover the payroll. This has provided an objective basis for alliances between the union
leadership and successive SANAA managers, since the principal goal of each is to secure sufficient tariff
income. As a result, tariff increases normally transmit rapidly into pay rises; this in turn  has strengthened
political resistance to tariff increases.
Table 12 analyses SANAA’s 1994 financial balance, showing how different subsidy elements contributed to
the company’s operations.  Current revenue was L.55 mn compared with current expenditure which totaled
11
L.123 mn, including an estimated L.50 mn of interest charges on the US$160 mn external debt on SANAA
projects. The resulting L.68 mn deficit was financed by depreciation charges of  L.12 mn and revenue
subsidies of L.56 mn, including: the partial non payment of energy and chemicals bills, and the non payment
of loan interest. In addition, SANAA received L.128 mn in capital transfers. Total subsidy to SANAA
represented 0.68% of GDP and was the equivalent of 334% of the company’s current revenue. 
Table 13 projects SANAA’s subsidy needs over the next decade, under three scenarios for system
performance.  The baseline scenario supposes that performance on tariffs, on cost efficiency and on urban
12
coverage remain unaltered at 1994 levels. In this scenario, the 100% tariff increase which was authorized in
late 1995 is quickly eroded by inflation; staffing levels remain persistently high; and labor and capital
productivity remain unchanged. 16
Table 12
SANAA's revenue account and estimated subsidy flows, 1994
Lps. mn % of % of GDP
revenue
Current revenue 55 100% 0.20%




Debt interest/ 1 50 92%
Depreciation 12 22%
Other costs 14 25%
Current balance -68 -123% -0.25%
Financing    
Depreciation 12 22%
Revenue subsidies 56 102%
Non payment of energy  4 7%
Non payment of chemicals 2 3%
Debt interest paid by government 50 92%
Total revenue subsidy 68 123% 0.25%
Capital transfers 128 233% 0.47%
Total subsidy 184 334% 0.68%
Notes:  1/ We applied the 3.5% average interest rate for 1989-95 to the outstanding stock of SANAA related debt
              2/ Nominal GDP in 1994 was Lps. 2.71 billion. The year end exchange rate was Lps.9.00 = US$1.00.
Source: Our analysis of data from SANAA, SECPLAN, Finance Ministry
On these assumptions, both costs and income rise in line with urban population growth (projected at 5% a
year over the next decade) and the system would register revenue deficits rising from around 0.3% of GDP
at present, to 0.7% in 2005. However, SANAA’s cash-flow would continue to be viable, so long as the
Government continues to absorb the debt service burden.  Net of debt service and depreciation charges, the
revenue deficit would remain stable and only slightly negative. 
This underlines the point that the existing situation is an equilibrium, in the sense that it could continue, so
long as the financial arrangements under which SANAA makes no debt service contribution are maintained.
Nevertheless, if either the Government or the financial agencies which fund the capital program were not
prepared to allow this, then the revenue and capital subsidies to SANAA would dry up, coverage would
drop behind population growth, and service quality would deteriorate. In this way, a crisis could be forced
by a political decision not to tolerate a continuation of SANAA’s poor performance.
  This scenario includes a provision for the cost of closing SANAA’s operating systems (including redundancy payments
13
and writing off the accounts receivable in the balance sheet) for their transfer to new operators. This cost would be comfortably
recouped within the decade, as a result of the resulting cost savings and revenue increases.
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Table 13
Projected performance of the SANAA system:  three scenarios
Millions of 1994 lempiras, and percentages 1994, 1995,   2000, 2005,
real est. proj. proj.
Baseline: no improvement in performance
Real tariff (% of 1994) 100% 100% 104% 104%
Unaccounted for water (% of production) 50% 50% 50% 50%
Coverage (% of urban households) 83% 83% 83% 83%
Current income 55 55 73 93
Current expenditure 123 151 321 370
Current Balance, L. mn -68 -96 -248 -277
Current balance, % of GDP -0.3% -0.3% -0.7% -0.7%
Optimistic scenario: rapid improvement in performance
Real tariff (% of 1994) 100% 100% 317% 496%
Unaccounted for water (% of production) 50% 50% 38% 25%
Coverage (% of urban households) 83% 84% 88% 93%
Current income 55 55 264 625
Current expenditure 123 151 309 352
Current Balance  -68 -96 -45 273
Current balance, % of GDP -0.3% -0.3% -0.1% 0.7%
Intermediate scenario: moderate improvement
Real tariff (% of 1994) 100% 100% 317% 317%
Unaccounted for water (% of production) 50% 50% 45% 40%
Coverage (% of urban households) 83% 83% 86% 88%
Current income 55 55 237 324
Current expenditure 123 151 310 355
Current Balance  -68 -96 -73 -31
Current balance, % of GDP -0.3% -0.3% -0.2% -0.1%
Source: Our calculations. Annex 2 details the assumptions used in preparing this table
The following general assumptions apply in all scenarios:          
Real interest rate on sector debt 3.5%
Depreciation rate on net capital stock 2.5%
Urban population growth 5%
Total investment 1995-2005 $197mn
The second scenario in table 13 shows that if the system’s performance were improved to normal levels, the
subsidy would not be necessary.  With average tariffs gradually increased five fold to the still-moderate level
of L.2.0  ($0.22) per M3, with labor costs halved through the implementation of normal levels of efficiency,
and with the programmed capital resources used relatively efficiently to increase coverage levels from 83%
to 93%, the system could get out of deficits by the end of the decade and generate a revenue surplus of just
under 1% of GDP by 2005, even after covering its debt service burden and financing the establishment of
new planning, regulatory and technical assistance functions.  The third, intermediate, scenario shows that a
13
more moderate tariff rise and more moderate productivity gains would enable the deficit to be stabilized at
around zero.
   Households within the system are the principal gainers from the status quo when its distributional impact is analyzed
14
as a zero sum game. However, since tariffs are not even sufficient to provide for maintenance programs, and there is a limit to the
amount of subsidy which can be extracted from the political system, the quality of their service is often low. In this sense, the status
quo is a negative sum game. It is possible that households in the system would be net gainers from a feasible combination of tariff
increases and service improvements.
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e) The political economy of low level equilibrium
We may conclude that the Honduran water sector shows the classic symptoms of a “low level equilibrium
trap”, in which the systems are financially crippled by low tariffs and high costs. As a result, unless the
water utilities can negotiate heavy subsidies, the quality of service provision must suffer. SANAA is the
operator which has most successfully negotiated subsidies, mainly through the provision of capital grants
from the central government. However, since the subsidy flow does not automatically rise when the system
expands, the company loses money by expanding. Therefore, coverage tends to stagnate. 
This tendency is reinforced by the fact that many production systems are gravity fed, so that the marginal
cost of water is usually above the average cost, because the cheapest sources are exploited first. This implies
that the necessary subsidy per connection for new connections is higher than that on the existing stock of
connections. 
This is the fundamental reason why SANAA has failed to expand services to cover Tegucigalpa’s marginal
barrios. In this context, the SANAA-UNICEF project to construct private systems, which SANAA then
supplies with water at the block tariff, is a second best solution, made necessary by SANAA’s inability to
set tariffs to reflect the marginal cost of incorporating these barrios into the principal network. 
The gainers from this status quo are the households who already have connections, and who receive heavily
subsidized water services, and the employees of the staff-heavy SANAA system, concentrated mainly in
Tegucigalpa. The principal losers are the households who cannot get into the system, because it is unable to
expand fast enough; these are mainly concentrated in the marginal barrios of the cities, especially,
Tegucigalpa.
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In recent years there has been increased awareness of the fundamental inequity of denying access to the
urban water systems to the poorest barrios, and of the potential for realizing very large welfare gains by
expanding water services to these communities. A formal estimate of the  welfare gains which might be had
from breaking out of the low level equilibrium is presented in a box below, and detailed in Annex 3.
However, it has proved difficult to organize the political and legislative changes needed to make this
possible. The vested interests arraigned in defense of the status quo have proved stronger than the forces in
favor of reform. Section II turns its attention to a detailed analysis of the stalled process of reform in the
Honduran water sector, and the prospects for its future success.19
The welfare gains from escaping from low level equilibrium 
Increased coverage of piped water brings welfare gains for the households who previously had to get their water from
alternative (more expensive and / or lower quality) sources, while increased tariffs imply losses for the households who
previously received a service for less than marginal cost, and now have to pay more. However, to the extent that existing
users are at present being supplied with water at an economic opportunity cost which is higher than their marginal
willingness to pay for it, the reduction of their consumption will add to net social welfare. This is likely to happen if the
increased tariff is implemented through billing for metered consumption. For the present study, these effects were
quantified on the basis of survey data and SANAA data for water demand. The details of the estimates are explained in
Annex 3.
Households without piped water in Tegucigalpa at present consume on average only 3.7 m per month and pay L.27 per
3 
m . If they had access to the piped water system they would pay only L.2 per m  and would consume an estimated 33 m .
3 3 3
The estimated net welfare gain per new client incorporated in the system is L.440 per month, which is comprised of the
benefit from reduced costs for the water they already consume, coupled with the consumer surplus arising from the large
expansion of their consumption, made possible by access to piped water. The whole of this gain is received by the new
client. For the existing clients, the net welfare gain is L.16 per month. This is the sum of a net welfare loss for the
consumer (who must now pay the full cost of his water, which was previously subsidized) and a net gain for SANAA
(which previously supplied the water below cost).
If urban coverage in the existing SANAA systems were to be increased to 93% by 2005 (as per the optimistic scenario in
table 13 of the main text), an estimated 29,000 households would benefit to the tune of L.440 a month. If coverage had
stagnated at 83%, there would have been 243,000 households with coverage; the net gain for each of these is L.16 per
month. The total net annual welfare gain is estimated at L.201 millions, equivalent to 0.7% of 1994 GDP. These results
are not greatly sensitive to the form of demand curve which is chosen. 
The reform of the sector aims to produce a transformation of the performance of all the urban water systems of Honduras -
not just those run at present by SANAA. As documented in Section I.1, the systems already in municipal hands, which
account for 65% of urban connections, exhibit similar weaknesses to those of SANAA. If reform were to produce similar
improvements in all the urban systems of Honduras, then the annual welfare gains would amount to 2.1% of GDP.20
II PERSPECTIVES FOR REFORM
Not surprisingly, in the face of the social, economic and fiscal costs identified in section I, the sector’s
performance has given rise to growing discontent among the agencies which provide capital finance to the
water and sanitation sector. As a result, during the Callejas administration (1990-94), discussions began
between the Banks and the Government about reform of the sector. During the Reina administration (1994-
98) these discussions intensified, crystallizing in a proposal to strip SANAA of the operation of water
systems, municipalizing the non metropolitan systems and establishing a private management contract for
the Tegucigalpa system. 
This proposal was supported by the offer of a sectoral adjustment loan, to be co-financed by the World
Bank and IADB, to the tune of $65 mn. This would have been Honduras’ fourth sectoral adjustment
program, following operations in agriculture, energy and public sector modernization. The proposal was
also reinforced by the IADB’s reluctante to make  finance further investments for the water and sanitation
sector until reform has been implemented. However, by mid1996, the adjustment operation had been
dropped due to the Government’s failure to push through the necessary legislation. 
This section traces the gestation of the reform proposal and presents a stakeholder analysis which shows
why the reform effort stalled.  It then goes on to argue that the failure was not simply one of political
management. The original proposal suffered from two weaknesses which undermined potential support. In
the first place, the reform centered on rapid municipalization, without establishing convincing mechanisms
for strengthening the institutional capacity of the municipalities. And secondly, although the reform
promoted the separation of system administration from political control, via the introduction of private and
mixed capital service providers, the regulatory provisions of the early drafts of the reform legislation were
weak, creating the fear that users might lose out when private service providers were introduced.  
1.  The failure of reform, 1994-96
In March 1994, the Banks agreed with SANAA on the broad lines of a reform to separate the functions of
operation and supervision, through the municipalization of SANAA’s systems. The Government established
a high-level commission to supervise the process. Soon afterwards, a technical support group was
established, with the participation of SANAA, the planning, health and finance ministries, and with the
economic cabinet’s economic policy analysis unit (UDAPE) as a secretariat. This group supervised a series
of Bank-funded consultancies to develop the reform proposal. 
For the Banks, the 1990 and 1991 local government legislation provided an obvious window of opportunity
for the divestment of the SANAA systems, since it established that the operation of water and sanitation
systems was a local government  function. In response, some municipalities had already requested the
transfer of their systems. The SANAA manager Jeronimo Sandoval strongly supported the idea of
transferring SANAA’s systems to municipal control and by early 1994 had agreed to the transfer of San
Lorenzo and Puerto Cortés. However, the local government legislation did not cancel SANAA’s
competencies in this area; nor did it mandate the transfer of all systems. It was therefore necessary to
promote further legislation. 
The main elements of the proposal which gradually emerged from this process over the following 12 months
were: a framework law for potable water services which would obligate the transfer of all SANAA’s The first and most general description of the proposed reform is laid out in the report of Chilean consultants Jorge Ducci
15
and Maximiliano Alvarez (1994). 
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systems to municipal control and close down SANAA; the creation of a sub-secretariat in the health ministry
to handle sector planning and finance; the creation of a new national institute to supply technical assistance
to the municipalities and for the development of rural systems; and the creation of an independent regulatory
agency to supervise both water quality and tariff setting. In this framework, municipalities were expected to
join together in multi-city water companies in order to take advantage of scale economies available in system
administration (especially billing and financial management).
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However, in September 1994, just six months into the reform process, Mr. Sandoval was transferred to head
the crisis-torn state electricity corporation, and was replaced as head of SANAA by Manuel Romero. Mr.
Romero quickly made it clear that he was opposed to the disappearance of SANAA. He argued that
SANAA’s problems should be resolved though the development of an enterprise culture, and believed he
could negotiate with the union a radical reduction in staffing and the flexibilization of work procedures, and
that he could persuade the political authorities of the need for a significant tariff increase. The fact that the
position of SANAA could change so radically following a change of manager, is a good measure of the lack
of a national policy and the resulting  personalization of sectoral strategy. 
SANAA now proposed regionalization as an alternative to municipalization. The regionalization strategy
was broadly similar to that being pursued by other water companies in the Central American region. The
development of this strategy in Honduras was supported by Central America’s regional body for cooperation
between water companies, CAPRE, with technical assistance from the German development agency GTZ. It
differs from municipalization in that it represents only an administrative decentralization of the national
water company, rather than the passing of the systems into the ownership of alternative legal entities. In this
context, SANAA began to resist the municipalization of the Puerto Cortés system and initiated an
experiment with a regional office in La Ceiba. As a result, from late 1994 onwards, there were two reform
strategies in play: the officially sponsored project, backed by the Banks, and SANAA’s alternative strategy.
The conflict came to a head at a seminar held in mid 1995, where Mr. Romero showed considerable skill in
lining up allies in support of his position. Among them were the planning ministry, which was also slated for
closure under the state modernization program and which headed the Government’s social cabinet; the
mayor of Tegucigalpa, Oscar Acosta, who viewed the management of the metropolitan system as too big a
task for the city government; and the existing body responsible for pubic service regulation (Comisión
Nacional Supervisora de Servicios Públicos, CNSSP), which was reluctant to accept a reduction of its
sphere of influence. The main supporters of the municipalization proposal were the Minister of the
Presidency, Armando Aguilar Cruz (who was also secretary of the Presidential Commission for the
Modernization of the State), and representatives of the mayors’ association, AHMON. However, AHMON
also expressed reservations with the formulation of the reform proposal, demanding municipal control of the
regulatory and sectoral planning agencies (AHMON, 1995).
The opponents of the reform criticized the complexity of the proposed reorganization, questioned the
wisdom of a rapid municipalization program, and argued that the closure of SANAA would damage rural
water development and disperse a valuable central core of technical competence. They also highlighted the
need for a two-thirds majority in Congress to close down SANAA, undermining the political viability of the
scheme. 22
In the second half of 1995, the reform process entered a confused period as the different actors maneuvered
for position and the Government and Banks adjusted their proposal to take account of the issues raised. By
the start of 1996, they had reached agreement on a significantly revised proposal, under which the water
systems would still be municipalized, but SANAA would survive, assuming the function of sectoral policy
maker, also responsible for technical assistance and for rural water development. The new scheme is
outlined in the box  on the following page.
The Banks agreed with the Government to accept just two conditions for the first tranche of the adjustment
program: the passing of the revised framework legislation, and the letting of a management contract for the
Tegucigalpa system, where half of SANAAs connections and most of its worst inefficiencies are
concentrated. This tactical move aimed to side-step Tegucigalpa’s refusal to accept the system, with the
intention of proceeding to a concession at a later date, following the Mexico City strategy (Foster, 1996:18).
In early 1996, consultants were commissioned to redraft the reform legislation and analyse the financial
feasability of a private management contract in Tegucigalpa. The consultant’s report concluded that, such is
the inefficiency in Tegucigalpa, that a private manager could turn SANAA’s existing $1 million annual
operating deficit for Tegucigalpa into a surplus of about the same amount, even after paying the contractor
for his services, and without raising tariffs. In May 1996, the Government placed an advertisement in The
Economist newspaper, requesting expressions of interest from international firms. 
 
Understandably, since that is where most of the vested interests in the status quo are housed, the proposal to
privatize the Tegucigalpa system provoked the strongest opposition yet to the reform project.  SANAA
manager Romero now declared his public hostility to the proposal  (El Heraldo, 17th June 1996 and El
Nuevo Día, 21st June 1996). He was vocally supported by the leader of the SANAA staff union, Francisco
Menjivar, who denounced privatization as a device to permit enormous tariff rises. 23
The proposed Honduran water sector reform: a summary
Organization of service delivery
C The water and sewerage systems owned by SANAA would be transferred to municipal ownership, free of debt, within
two years.
C The law explicitly permits and encourages the use of private agents and mixed companies to run the municipal
systems, through management contracts, leasing or concessions. While it also allows for the operation of systems by
municipal departments, it stipulates that provision should by preference be indirect.
C Transitional provisions would clear the way for a private management contract for the Tegucigalpa system, to be let
directly by SANAA, subject to municipal approval.
Regulation
C An independent regulatory commission would be created, with three commissioners nominated by the President. Two
of the candidates would be taken from short lists provided by the colleges of civil engineers and economists. They
would serve for 5 years (the presidential term is 4 years).
C There would be no national tariff, but the regulator would establish norms for calculating tariffs on a cost-plus basis,
using the “model enterprise” system, and no operator would be allowed to tariff at above full efficiency cost. The
regulator would oversee contracts made between municipalities and private agencies.
C Municipalities would be allowed to cross-subsidize within the water tariff but not to use water revenues to fund other
services.
C The regulator would be free to declare “self regulatory” status for smaller systems.
C Access to public resources would be conditional on compliance with recommended practice on tariffing. This is
conceived as a key regulatory mechanism, to promote good performance and avoid under tariffing by municipal
operators.
Sectoral strategy
C SANAA would survive, responsible for strategic planning and technical assistance, and acting as advisor to the
Finance Ministry on the allocation of public capital resources in the sector. 
Rural water
C SANAA would also retain responsibility for the development of rural water supplies and for the implementation of
capital works on a regional scale. 
Source: Our summary, based on Rendon Cano, 1996
The SANAA union was given an easy pitch on which to bat, because the reform camp had failed to make a
clear statement at an early stage about the regulator’s mandate to control tariffs to efficiency levels. In fact,
in early drafts of the proposed legislation, due to the reluctance of the municipalities to be subject to tariff
regulation (justified, spuriously, by the principle of “municipal autonomy”), there was no provision at all for
regulatory control of maximum tariffs. This allowed opponents to scare-monger about the tariff increases
which would come with privatization. This was corrected in the July 1996 draft, summarized above, which
was influenced by the intervention of IADB regulation specialists, but by that time, the damage had been
done.
Mr Romero also produced a legal sophistry to block the idea of a private management contract for
Tegucigalpa. He argued that SANAA’s constitutive legislation does not allow for contracting private agents
to run the water services in its remit. This was debatable, since there is a general provision for
administrative delegation in Honduran law, which includes the option of delegation to private agents.
Nevertheless, the Banks accepted that the management contract would have to be put on hold, pending the
passing of the framework legislation, which would make explicit the legality of management contracts,
leasing arrangements and concessions, and would allow SANAA directly to make management contracts
during the transition period, with the agreement of the relevant municipality (see box). This analysis broadly follows the methodology developed by Crosby (1992 a, b, and c).
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This episode was the coup de grace for the adjustment loan. The Government’s failure to replace Mr.
Romero at the head of SANAA, even after he assumed a stance of direct public opposition, was the final
blow to the credibility of Honduras’ committment to the operation. With other sectoral adjustment loans in
difficulty due to non-compliance with their conditionalities, with Honduras’ IMF agreement in suspension
due to missed fiscal targets, and with an election year in the offing, the Banks quietly deleted the Water and
Sanitation Sector Structural Adjustment Credit from their work programs and began to search for an
alternative strategy to secure passage of the reform. 
In the meantime, they centered their efforts on preparing future investment credits and technical assistance
for municipally run systems. Although both Banks continued to insist that the framework legislation was a
sine qua non for future support to the sector, at the end of 1996, the legislation had still not been submitted
to Congress, and the probability that it would be passed during the final year of the Reina administration
seemed low. 
2.  A stakeholder analysis of the reform
Table 14 presents a stakeholder analysis, which identifies the forces lined up in favor of and in opposition to
the reform. The analysis divides the actors into three groups: external actors; the Government (including the
Congress); and other national actors. For each actor, it defines their potential interest in the issue,
establishes what position they took and describes the resources at their disposal to pursue their interest.  
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This analysis underlines the weakness of support for the reform, making it easy to see why the adjustment
operation failed to materialize.
In the first place, the Government’s failure to coordinate the external support to the sector allowed each
development agency to promote its own line. There was strong support for the reform only from the two
Banks which proposed to co-finance the adjustment operation.  USAID, which has long promoted
municipalization, supported the transfer of water systems to municipal control, but had reservations about
whether this should be mandatory rather than voluntary and opposed the proposal for a national regulator
nominated by the central government. 25
Table 14
A stakeholder analysis of the reform of the water sector
Group Interest in the issue Position on  reform Resources available
External actors
World Bank Promotes  reform in infrastructure sector; Strong support Structural adjustment financing $30 mn
needs to lend.
IADB Finances the sector; needs to lend. Strong support Structural adjustment financing $35 mn
plus ability to withhold investment loans
to sector
International firms Possible contracts for management and Support Ability  to offer technical assistance to
concessions; contracts for consultancy reform planning process
Bilateral lenders Finance the sector No general position; USAID Financial resources and TA
supports  voluntary transfer to
municipal control but opposes
compulsion and opposes the creation
of a central-government controlled
regulatory  agency. GTZ opposes,
JICA has not declared.
CAPRE Regional body for state water companies in Opposed - promotes alternative TA; capacity to legitimize the opposition
C.A. regionalization strategy to reform.
OPS Concerned with rural primary health None declared Few
Government
SANAA Existing agency - would lose the function of Strong opposition - proposes Technical capacity; controls information;
operating aqueducts, but would remain in alternative  of modernization and able to dedicate itself full time to
charge of sectoral strategy. regionalization maneuvering on the issue; strong personal
relationship of manager Romero with the
President; strong support from SANAA
professional staff for Romero
President Ultimately responsible for defining Not apparently interested in the Ability to impose his decision within the
Government policy and for relations with substance of the issue. Executive - but not on the Congress
the World Bank and IADB.
Pr esidentia l Prime agency for modernization; sees sector Strongly in favor - secretary Ability to influence the President; access
Commission for reform as a complementary element to the Armando Aguilar Cruz (also to TA from Banks; but not influential with
Modernization of the general program. Minister of the Presidency) is the majority Flores faction  in Congress
State (CPME) reform's main public advocate. (linked to Reina faction).
Economic Cabinet Responsible  for Balance of Payments Though  originally skeptical, Ability to influence President.
management - needs adjustment loan to be coordinator Guillermo Bueso
approved.  Also concerned with supported the reform  - but more due
infrastructure efficiency. to need of the adjustment loan than
support for reform per se.
Continued.....26
Table 14 (continued)
Group Interest in the issue Position on  reform Resources available
Health Ministry General  responsibility for water and No clearly defined position Presides in the SANAA board; moral
sanitation - special interest in rural systems authority on health related impacts of
and for technical norms sectoral reform
Planning Ministry Was the ministry responsible for public Opposed - supported SANAA Presided in Social Cabinet which includes
investment program at the time - since then, proposal (solidarity among bodies the  Health Ministry, which in turn
it has been abolished. threatened  with closure due to the supervises the water and sanitation sector.
adjustment program)
CNSSP Existing tariff regulator - defending its turf. Opposed - supports SANAA Technical capacity to question proposals
proposal
Congress Would have to legislate to pass framework No declared position Can block the reform
law
Other actors
Municipalities Would take over the aqueducts - potential Diverse positions: AHMON broadly Lobbying power; also, could block the
for increased scope of activity, income, etc. supports transfer of water systems to reform by refusing to accept systems.
But also high risks from taking over run- municipal  control but wants  a
down systems which they are not well resource guarantee; would prefer that
equipped to administer. the transfer of systems were optional
rather than compulsory; and opposes
the creation of a national government
controlled  regulator. The
municipality of Tegucigalpa is not
interested in taking over the capital’s
water and sewerage systems, which
are half SANAA’s customers; many
other  municipalities are concerned
about  getting increased
responsibilities without resources.
SANAA union Loss of jobs and of opportunities for Strong opposition to reform Lobbying power (influential with  leading
corruption deputies in the controlling Flores faction
of Congress); scare tactics on price rises;
xenophobic rhetoric
Users  of SANAA Would face tariff increases but could get No clear public opinion on the matter If politicians fear that the measure is
system improved service unpopular  with existing users, who are
relatively articulate with access to the
media, this could cause a Congressional
veto
Non-users (marginal Presently unable to get piped water due to No clear public opinion on the matter Patronato  organizations have lobbying
barrios) low level equilibrium trap power
National private sector Fear of increased tariffs; opportunities for No clear public opinion on the matter Very considerable lobbying power
(COHEP, Cámaras de contracts
Comercio  e
Industrias)
Political parties Opportunity to win popularity / risk of losing No important political group argued Influence of Liberal and National parties is
popularity strongly for the reform; not viewed as decisive in Congress.
a popular cause.
Other bilateral agencies such as GTZ and JICA effectively opposed the proposal, giving support to the
alternative regionalization strategy promoted by SANAA. JICA provided grant funds to upgrade the La
Ceiba system, giving credibility to the regionalization option and helping to dampen support for
municipalization in that city. Since GTZ supports the association of Central American water companies,
CAPRE, it has considerable moral authority in the field, so its absence from the reform camp was Interview with Luis Moncada Gross, June 1995
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important. Similarly, although it co-funded the initial diagnostic study which set the scene for the reform, the
Panamerican Health Organization never declared its position.
The Government itself was divided on the matter. The only government agency strongly committed to the
reform was the Presidential Commission for State Modernization (CPME by its Spanish initials); it also
enjoyed the support of the Economic Cabinet, which needed the balance of payments resources the operation
would have released, and which subscribed to the general project of improving the effectiveness of public
infrastructure investment. But these met with strong opposition from SANAA and opposition also from the
Planning Ministry and the existing regulatory agency, CNSSP, which wished to defend its turf. The
President of the Republic appeared to have no position on the issue and was known to have a high personal
regard for the SANAA manager, Mr. Romero. When the President failed to intervene to resolve the
differences of opinion within the Government, the reform process simply disintegrated.
The analysis in Table 14 also highlights the weakness of national support for the project outside government
circles. In the preparatory phase of the reform, research studies were commissioned which underlined the
inequity of the exiting situation, but, in spite of the huge potential welfare gains to be had from improving
the sector’s performance, no “political entrepreneur” emerged to mobilize the potential support to be found
among households without water, or with very poor services, which lose out from the status quo. 
The patronatos (barrio committees) of the urban marginal sector remained indifferent to the debate on
municipalization. Even the municipalities - purportedly the main gainers from the process - remained
cautious, unsure of the consequences of taking on their water systems,  keen to secure a guarantee of
resources up front, and reluctant to accept external regulation. 
The leaders of the private sector (organized in the Consejo Hondureño de la Empresa Privada, COHEP),
normally the most vociferous proponents of privatization initiatives, had nothing to say on the issue of water
privatization. The SANAA employees’ union, on the other hand, intervened effectively in the debate,
persuading leading Congressional politicians that if they supported the privatization proposal, they risked
being tarred as authors of a violent tariff increase for water in an election year. 
The absence of a strong national alliance in favor of the reform was fatal to the prospects for the reform
legislation. The only strong supporters of reform with real power at their disposal were the Banks, because
they hold the purse strings on balance of payments support and on future loans to the sector. But recent
experience shows that the Congress will not automatically kow-tow to the Executive’s macroeconomic
necessities at the cost of its own political expediency. Throughout 1996, Honduras’ IMF agreement was in
suspension following the Congress’ decision to push through income tax cuts which increased the
consolidated public sector deficit above the agreed ceilings.
In the medium term, the IADB’s ability to offer large scale finance for future water sector investments will
be a crucial lever. The bank can insist on satisfactory progress on sector regulation, organization and
performance in return for new funding. Just as in the past, when centralization was in fashion in the water
sector, the IADB prevailed on SANAA to take over the systems of Tela, Juticalpa and Ceiba in return for
financial support,   the bank can now force the transfer of systems to municipal control. He who pays the
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piper, as the old say has it, calls the tune. 28
Nevertheless, the political process of reform would be eased, and the prospects for the successful
functioning of the new model would be improved, if the legitimate concerns expressed by some of the
reforms’ opponents were addressed. The two most controversial aspects of the reform were: the proposed
rapid municipalization of al SANAA’s systems; and the absence of a sufficiently clear regulatory guarantee
for users. The following sections discuss each of these points in detail. Section three discusses the issue of
municipalization, and section four focusses on the issue of regulation in the context of increased private
involvement.
3. The debate over municipalization 
The rapid municipalization of service delivery is a central plank of the proposed reform.  All SANAA’s
water systems would be passed to the ownership of their respective municipalities within two years, free of
debt (Rendón Cano, 1996: Articles 13, 14 and 15). However, the latest (July 1996) version of the draft
legislation, summarized on page 23,  leaves open the possibility that in some cases this may not happen, in
which case SANAA would continue to run the systems (Ibid: Article 16). The inclusion of this clause at a
late stage in the drafting process was a tacit acknowledgment of the widespread skepticism about the
capacity of many municipalities to manage their water systems.
Nevertheless, it remains the case that in recent years, the main form of political mobilization for water sector
reform has been organized around the demand for transfer of SANAA systems to municipal control. This
has happened normally where SANAA systems have been in a state of collapse and where local political
leaders have seized on the resulting popular discontent. In two cases, San Lorenzo and Puerto Cortés, these
mobilizations led to the transfer of system administration to municipal control. This section discusses the
results of these initiatives, and also looks at  SANAA’s  establishment of a decentralized regional office in
La Ceiba, as an alternative to the municipalization strategy. Each of these experiences gives pointers for the
problems and potentialities of a national decentralization process. 
a) Recent experiences in municipalization
Since 1993, in the context of the process of political and administrative descentralization which followed the
the municipal legislation of 1990-91, SANAA has delegated responsibility for management, operation and
maintenance of aqueducts to local governments in San Lorenzo, Puerto Cortés and Tela.  In each case, the 
ownership of the system remained with SANAA. The first two cases were piecemeal initiatives in response
to local political pressures for improvements in water supply and in each case the system inherited by the
municipality was in extremely poor condition. In Tela, where the system was in a better physical state due to
a recent investment program, the transfer was promoted by SANAA, apparently in a crude attempt to
discredit municipalization.
The first delegation was made in February 1993 to San Lorenzo, a port city of 18,000 people located in
southern Honduras. The city had serious problems with water sources and coverage was estimated at only
55% of households, with very poor frequency of supply (once per week during some parts of the year).
Physical losses were estimated at 60% of production. SANAA supported the delegation process, helping
with a system survey, the inventory of fixed assets, and in staffing decisions. 
At first, the municipality had problems dealing with the commercial administration and technical difficulties
with the pumping system. Nevertheless, following the organization of a technical unit within the Engineering29
Department, the municipality assumed full responsibility for the system. The municipal administration has
replaced an important water main, opened new wells and incorporated new barrios into the system. 
Coverage has risen to 80%; physical losses have been reduced to an estimated 30%; and service frequency
improved to every-other-day. Finance for these improvements came from a L.3.1million loan from
Germany's KFW; and from  the 4% of National Port Authority and customs revenues, which is granted to
port cities under Decreto 72-86.
In Puerto Cortés, a north coast port city with a population of 50,000, the municipalization of water services
was part of the winning platform of the Liberal Party in the 1993 mayoral elections. This followed protests
(including closure of the main highway) when SANAA proved slow in repairing storm damage which
severely interrupted supplies in 1993.  In early 1994, SANAA  approved the transfer. However, following
the September 1994 appointment of Mr. Romero as General Manager, SANAA reversed its policy.  As a
result, the negotiation took 16 months to complete and the transfer was delayed to April 1995. Puerto Cortés
was required to cover L.1 million in severance pay of former SANAA employees, offset against the
accounts receivable inherited from SANAA. 
Following municipalization, a respected SANAA engineer was recruited as system manager and the World
Bank and USAID provided sustained technical assistance, the latter vía FUNDEMUN. Substantial
improvementswere achieved in production (up by 40%) and in service frequency (up from 12 to 20 hours a
day). USAID provided a $3 million loan (vía the Fondo Hondureño de Inversión Social, FHIS) to build a
new dam on the Río Tulian, further expanding productive capacity, and Puerto Cortés funded $1.5 million
of investment with its own funds (using the 4% received from the National Port Aurthority). Employees per
1,000 conexions were reduced from 7.6  in April 1995 to 4.7 at mid 1996.  The metering of industrial
consumption rose, from 102 functioning meters to 385 and in 1997 the municipality began a program to
establish 100% metering of domestic consumption within two years. Illegal conexions were halved, monthly
billing rose from Lps.132,000 to Lps.520,000, and revenues as percentage of billing increased from 61% to
103%, reflecting a successful effort to recoup accounts receivable. On the basis of these successes, in 1997
Puerto Cortés secured Congressional approval for the definitive transfer of the system’s ownership to the
municipality.
In Tela, a north coast city of 35,000 inhabitants, SANAA invested L.6.4 million in water production,
treatment and distribution in the early nineties, under the IADB’s Four Cities project, raising coverage to
87%. However, the system still registered very large losses (60%), mainly attributable to the non-separation
of the old distribution system built by the Tela Railroad Company, and that billing and collection were non
existent. 
In February 1996, SANAA, unexpectedly and rapidly, ceded administration to the municipality;  the transfer
was seen by many observers as a deliberate attempt to discredit the strategy of rapid municipalization. The
municipality recruited a relatively inexperienced manager, who  initially recieved technical assistance from
FUNDEMUN on how to cut physical losses; they recommended separating the Tela Railroad Company
system and sectorializing the network. However, a conflict arose when the tests for this work led to service
cuts in the city, the FUNDEMUN contract was suspended, and Tela began to depend on the SANAA
regional office at El Progreso for support. These problems led to a meeting between the Ministry of
Government, SANAA, AHMON and the Municipality of Tela, where it was reportedly agreed that future
municipalizations would be more carefully planned.30
b) SANAA’S regionalization strategy - the case of La Ceiba
La Ceiba, a north coast city with 100,000 inhabitants and around 13,000 domestic connections, suffered
similar problems to Puerto Cortés in 1993, when tropical storms damaged dams, storage tanks and
pipelines, severely disrupting services. Low rainfall in 1994 accentuated the crisis, when pumping from dry
wells led to equipment damage. Local pressure for municipalization was strong. Sensitive to the danger of
losing another major operation to municipal control, SANAA turned La Ceiba into a testing ground for the
alternative strategy of regionalization.
In 1995, a Regional Office was created in the city, with autonomy in operations, including hiring,
purchasing, and billing. All income generated by the La Ceiba system was to be locally retained to pay for
the operation and maintenance of the system and to finance minor investments. The Regional Office also
oversees rural aqueducts in the area of Atlántida, Colón and Yoro, but the income generated by these
systems remains in their respective localities. However, the La Ceiba Regional Office has been characterized
by managerial improvisation in the face of emergencies, and by early 1997 relations with Tegucigalpa had
not yet reached a stable definition. SANAA still lacks a coherent operating model of regional
decentralization. 
SANAA has supported the La Ceiba  initiative with a generous assignment of capital resources. In parallel
with the creation of the Regional Office, SANAA obtained a Japanese grant of US$900,000 to install new
wells, storage tanks and pumping equipment, to complement the gravity run system. Although the
investment program was clumsily managed and the funds spent considerable time on deposit awaiting
implementation, the eventual result was a marked service improvement. The proportion of clients with 24
hour service rose from 6% in 1994 to 88% in 1996. Other performance indicators also registered marginal
improvements: employees per 1000 conexions fell from 5.2 in 1994 to 4.2 in June 1996 and, in response to
the incentive that income is now locally retained, monthly billing quadrupled to L.425,000 in mid 1996, up
from L.111,000 in 1994. However, revenues rose by only 40%, hardly ahead of inflation. 
Meanwhile, the municipality of La Ceiba continued to recieve technical assistance from USAID, through the
Fundación de Desarrollo Municipal (FUNDEMUN), to determine the technical and financial feasability of
muncipalization. However, the improvement in service secured by the SANAA investment reduced local
pressure for municipalization.
c) Lessons to be learned from the municipalization process
A definitive conclusion on the success of municipalization must await the generalization of the strategy and
a review of performance in the medium and long run. But the experiences of San Lorenzo, Puerto Cortés
and Tela offer some important pointers on factors which favor success in the municipalization process. 
In the first place, the size of the municipality does not appear to be a decisive factor, within the range
covered by these cases: in both San Lorenzo, the smallest of the three, and Puerto Cortés, the largest, the
results are clearly positive. However, the “administrative delegation” of SANAA systems to the
municipalities has been difficult to manage. It leads to a game in which each party seeks to unload
responsabilities on the other and leaves open the possibility that SANAA might seek to cancel the
arrangement once the principal problems have been resolved. The transfer of system ownership as31
contemplated in the proposed reform legislation, and already achieved in Puerto Cortés, is a much cleaner
device.
Secondly, municipalization is most likely to succeed where it responds to strong local political support and
where willingness to pay for improved services is high. Therefore, the priority in the decentralization
program should be given to the cities where the problems are greatest and the potential for service
improvement is highest. However, these conditions are most likely to exist when the existing system of
production and distribution is in serious difficulty. This in turn implies that the availability of technical
assistance and access to capital resources are likely to be important factors determining the success of the
transfer. In both San Lorenzo and Puerto Cortés, the interventions of bilateral and multilateral agencies
proved important.
Thirdly, managerial capacity is likely to be a key bottleneck in any form of decentralization process in
Honduras, where qualified human resources are scarce. Therefore, wherever feasible, municipalities should
be encouraged to combine forces in order to exploit managerial and administrative economies of scale, and
the pace of the reform process should be geared to the availability of the human and capital resources needed
to make it a success, rather than being forced to meet a program of conditionality. 
This, in turn, implies that an adjustment operation was not an ideal vehicle for the reform project, since such
operations require that irreversible change be demonstrated within a limited time frame. It is not easy to
ensure irreversible change simply through framework legislation, and the implementation of sector
reorganization may take longer to organize than is normally permissible for an adjustment program. This
sets up a tension between the need to design a program which is acceptable in terms of Washington’s criteria
for adjustment operations and the need to answer legitimate Honduran concerns about the risks of an overly
precipitate process. 
Fourthly, in the absence of a properly defined national scheme for the allocation of technical assistance and
capital resources, there has been a “free for all” in which different agencies attempt to “adopt” one or more
municipalities (rather as some aid agencies promote the “adoption” of a needy child). For example, USAID
and the World Bank have supplied municipalized Puerto Cortés with technical assistance and capital
resources, while JICA has supported SANAA’s regionalization strategy through investments in La Ceiba. In
this way, some important municipalities have been able to take advantage of programs financed by
international agencies, but the result is not necessarily conducive to a rational reorganization of the sector,
especially since each agency seeks to use the resources at its disposal to promote whatever model it  happens
to favor.
This experience highlights the need for a coherent national policy framework, tying the distribution of
resources to an overall sectoral strategy. Generous injections of technical assistance and capital are likely to
produce good results on service coverage and quality in the short run, regardless of the form of organization
of service delivery, but these tell us little about the intrinsic virtues of the municipalization and
regionalization options. The real test of both models is their ability to succeed when they are generalized,
and in the long run, not their ability to succeed as “demonstration projects” with preferential access to
technical and financial support. 32
4. The organization and regulation of service provision:  key issues for the success of reform
In the long run, the key indicators of success are those related to physical and financial efficiency rather than
those related to a city’s capacity to attract public investment funds. If decentralization were simply to
reproduce at a local level the same systemic weaknesses which have led to failure in the centralized model,
the result might be a proliferation of mini SANAAs with the familiar pattern of political, workforce and user
capture of system rents, stagnant coverage and poor service quality. In this sense, municipalization should
not in itself be regarded as the central principle of sectoral reform. 
For this reason, it is unfortunate that many supporters of the reform have seen it simply as part of the
ongoing struggle to shift the balance of power between central government and the municipalities, and have
little conception of the importance of the separation of functions between strategic planning, operation, and
regulation for the future success of the reorganized sector. The municipal lobby wanted all of these functions
under municipal control, which would have reproduced in a decentralized form the same systemic
weaknesses which dog the existing, centralized, arrangements. For this reason, there is a need to develop a
working model for the municipal management of water services, which protects them from political,
employee or user capture, and to provide the municipalities with technical assistance to implement it. The
following paragraphs detail the main aspects of such a model, as outlined in the latest version of the reform
proposal.
a) System organization
The proposed legislation provides that municipalities may run their services directly (through municipal
departments; autonomous agencies or public corporations) or indirectly,  in the form of concessions, leases
or management contracts to private agents or mixed capital companies, jointly owned by municipalities and
private investors (Article 33), and allows for inter-municipal associations in any of these forms (Article 35).
However, it stipulates that indirect provision is the preferred form of service delivery, which should
normally be adopted unless there is no available agent or the cost of direct municipal service delivery is
demonstrably lower (Article 37). 
In this way, the legislation creates a strong presumption in favor of a clear organizational and financial
separation of the water system from the rest of the municipality’s operations.  However, to turn this into a
reality, it will be necessary to develop a model of independent provision which can be implemented in the
major municipalities. To this end, during 1997, the IADB was developing a pilot project in Puerto Cortés to
establish a mixed-capital company, co-owned by the municipality and private investors, which would
operate the water and sewerage system on a leasing arrangement, following the Spanish and French model.
b) The regulatory system
The arrangements for sectoral regulation are central to the political viability of the plan for increased private
sector participation. As argued above, the lack of clarity on this issue was the Achilles’ heel of the proposal
for a private management contract for Tegucigalpa.
As well as protecting users from over tariffing, regulation should also ensure that the expected return on the
system’s investment (the so-called “quasi-rent”) is not subject to capture by local politicians or system
users, via pressure on the regulator to limit tariffs to unreasonably low levels. In the absence of such a33
mechanism, the fiscal costs of the publicly-run systems will be high, due to continued deficits, and it will be
impossible to attract private capital to substitute for public resources and facilitate the expansion of
coverage. 
The 1996 draft legislation (summarized in the box on page 23) provides for a coherent national regulatory
system. It contemplates the creation of a specialist three-person regulatory commission for water and
sanitation services. The Comisión Nacional de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado Sanitario (henceforward, the
Commission) would be nominated for five years by the President of the Republic, with two members to be
taken from slates submitted, respectively, by the Colleges of Civil Engineers and Economists. To strengthen
independence from political interference and regulatory continuity, the commissioners’ five year period of
office is different from that of the presidency (four years). The commissioners would themselves have
different (overlapping) periods, rather than all being nominated at the same time. The Commission would be
financed by a tariff component to be collected by all system operators; its expenditure budget would be set
by the Congress of the Republic. 
The Commission would have the power to limit maximum tariffs of any service provider to an efficiency
level; the law would explicitly forbid the inclusion in the tariff of costs which result from inefficiency
(Article 63). However, cross subsidies would be permitted. Any tariff change would require the
Commission’s approval and the operator would be required to supply the information necessary for its
evaluation (Article 64). The definition of efficiency would be a “cost plus” or “rate of return” mechanism,
apparently on a “model enterprise” basis, similar to the Chilean model (Article 66), which is considered
more appropriate than a price cap for Honduras, due to macroeconomic uncertainty and the importance of
guaranteeing a reasonable rate of return to private investors in the initial phase of private involvement. 
The Commission would concentrate on the regulation of the relatively large systems, delegating the
regulatory function in rural areas to the municipalities. The Commission would also supervise compliance
with contractual agreements between the Government, municipalities and private operators. In accordance
with the principle of “municipal autonomy”, the municipalities would retain the freedom to set their own
tariffs at levels below the recommended level. However, the tariff regime of any municipality which
contracts loans with central government would be subject to regulation to ensure the financial viability of the
loan. 
 
c) The security of the regulatory environment
The regulatory provisions described above should provide a satisfactory basis for improved performance.
However, they may not in themselves be sufficient to promote large scale private investment in the sector.
Potential investors are concerned, not only with the content of the regulations, but also with the security of
the regulatory environment. The letting of concessions to operate water services in the capital cities of Latin
America has been dogged by the perception of high political risk, as illustrated most recently in Caracas. 
Honduras has a poor international image for investment risk, due partly to macroeconomic factors (like debt
overhang) but partly also to a recent history of arbitrary action by the executive, legislative and judicial
authorities in matters involving transactions between the Honduran state and foreign companies (such as the
privatization of state companies and the international letting of contracts for infrastructure development). 34
The reduction of this sort of risk depends on the whole process of political, administrative and judicial
modernization, which is still at an early stage. The design of a sectoral strategy in relation to the need for
public investment resources should be based on reasonable assumptions about that process. In the short to
medium term, the best prospects for private sector financial involvement in large scale sunk investments are
probably to be found in San Pedro Sula, where political risk may be perceived to be lower than in
Tegucigalpa.35
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Honduran water and sanitation sector’s overall performance in recent years has been disappointing, and
both the systems operated by the centralized Servicio Autónomo Nacional de Agua y Alcantarillado
(SANAA) and those operated by municipal governments show similar weaknesses. The causes of poor
performance are related to the existing organization of the sector, in a classic pattern of low level
equilibrium (LLE). The roots of the problem lie, firstly, in the confusion between sectoral planning and
resource allocation (which are strategic or political functions) and system operation (which should be
isolated from political considerations). 
This problem has two important manifestations. At a national level, SANAA both operates systems and
plays a leading role in determining priorities for capital resources. As a result, the SANAA-operated
systems (especially that of the capital city, Tegucigalpa) get more than their share of subsidized capital
resources. More generally,  the political control of all the operating bodies, both at national and municipal
level, means that water utilities lack financial independence and are subject to the capture of system rents by
users, politicians and workers. This leads, amongst other things, to under-tariffing and results in
inefficiencies in the scale of service provision (under-expansion / low coverage) and in the operation of
existing systems (poor maintenance, low productivity and generally feeble commercial systems). It also
leads to a vicious circle of low credibility and low willingness to pay, because users - with reason - do not
believe that revenues from the water tariff will necessarily be used to improve services. New evidence on
willingness to pay supports this conclusion.
The second factor contributing to the LLE is the generalized failure of the regulatory function. No
organization exists to define or defend the rights and interests of the actual and potential users of water and
sewerage services. The regulation of water quality is ineffectual and the only form of economic regulation is
that of the SANAA tariff, which is highly politicized and directly contributes to under-tariffing. Municipal
systems are effectively unregulated.
Non-transparent subsidies make SANAA’s financial balance sustainable, and the existing situation is an
equilibrium in the classic sense of the term, in that it could continue indefinitely, so long as the political
settlements which facilitate it are left in place. But there is no objective need for wholesale subsidy to the
sector. On reasonable assumptions about improved performance, SANAA’s systems could be self financing
within five years, and enormous potential welfare benefits are to be had from breaking out of the LLE. 
The case for reform is therefore overwhelming, but the interests favored by the status quo are strong and
well organized, so that the political task of organizing reform is a considerable one.
A stakeholder analysis of the failed Water and Sanitation Sector Structural Adjustment Credit, jointly
supported by the World Bank and the IADB during 1994-96, highlights the problems of reform, and
illustrates the limited capacity of adjustment finance to secure change in the absence of a clear national
policy decision.
However, the reform’s failure was not simply one of political management. The reform proposal itself
suffered from important weaknesses, which undermined support. In the first place, the proposal made a
central principle of municipalization, but failed to address the poor performance of many existing municipal
systems, and placed insufficient emphasis on the need to protect system operation from political interference.36
Most municipal governments in Honduras suffer from similar credibility problems to those of the central
government, so a proposal which did not address these issues was bound to be unconvincing to many.
Secondly, as a result of the municipalities’ reluctance to be subjected to a national regulatory agency, the
reform proposal did not adequately address the issue of regulation until it was too late. Early drafts of the
legislation concentrated on linking municipalities’ access to capital resources to good financial performance.
The emphasis was on the use of incentives to avoid under-tariffing, but there was no regulatory provision to
prevent over-tariffing. This led to a setback when the municipality of the capital city, Tegucigalpa, refused
to take over its water system, which accounts for half of SANAA’s operation, and in response, a plan to
privatize the management of the metropolitan system was hurriedly tacked on to the reform. In the absence
of a clear regulatory guarantee for users, the reform’s opponents had a field day with the prospect of a
private operator levying extortionary tariffs.
In the final draft of the reform proposal, completed in mid 1996, most of these issues are satisfactorily
resolved. The law creates a presumption in favor of indirect forms of service provision, in which the
opportunities for political capture are minimized, and the regulatory arrangements are well conceived. The
study concludes that reform effort should now proceed on parallel tracks, at national and local levels. The
approval of the framework law and creation of the national regulatory, planning and technical assistance
bodies, should be complemented by the development at municipal level of a workable model of indirect
service provision. This could first be applied in existing municipal systems, ready to be extended to the
SANAA systems once the law is passed.37
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ANNEX 1
THE EFFECT OF SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION ON WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR
IMPROVED WATER SERVICES : ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE
A national survey of water demand conducted for SANAA and the World Bank by the authors in 1995 (Walker and
Ordoñez, 1995) provides interesting insights into the credibility of different sorts of system administration in the
eyes of the users. 
Willingness to pay for improved water services might be expected to vary under different conditions of system
organization, for two reasons:
C Willingness to pay for promised service improvements will be a positive function of the respondent’s
confidence that the improved service will materialize (due to more efficiency and/or less corruption).
C Willingness to pay will be an inverse function of the perceived scope for rent seeking. If users believe that they
can achieve better services through political mechanisms, their willingness to pay to get them will be lower.
Therefore, if publically run systems have relatively low credibility as service providers, and are relatively prone to
rent seeking behavior, one would expect them to report lower willingness to pay than that observed among the users
of private systems.
In the survey, households with a piped water connection with a service inferior to 4 hours per day were asked if they
would be prepared to pay a given price for an improved service, defined as: at least 4 hours a day of potable water at
a good pressure. Although the survey was not designed for this purpose, the structure of the sample allows us to
analyze the impact of the type of system administration on willingness to pay for water. The question was answered
by 601 households: 230 SANAA clients, 110 with municipally run systems, 106 with systems administered by
Juntas de Agua in their barrios (part of the SANAA-UNICEF project in Tegucigalpa) and 155 with systems
administered by patronatos at a barrio level. These households were distributed geographically as follows: 304 in
Tegucigalpa; 174 in Choluteca, of which 125 were SANAA clients and 49 were clients of the municipality; 61 in
Santa Rosa de Copán (a municipal system); and 62 in Comayagua (a SANAA system). 
The analysis was conducted using SPSS' multivariate logistical regression procedure, which allows us to identify the
impact of system administration on willingness to pay, independently of the impact of other potential causes of
difference. Twelve independent variables thought likely to affect willingness to pay were tested: system
administration, price offered for the improved service, present payment for piped water, household income,
frequency of the existing service, a wealth index based on artefact tenure; expenditure of money and time on getting
water from alternative sources, education and sex of the respondent, the presence of a flush toilet in the household,
and the geographical location. Of these, nine (including system administration) are included in the best available
model of factors affecting the probability of a positive response by the household. The results are reported in Tables
A1.1.41
Table A1.1
The relationship between system administration and willingness to pay for water in Honduras
Econometric estimate B Average Units Elements Significance R
value of a
Price offered for improved system -0.058 0.000 ** * -0.28
Monthly household income 0.000 2,048 L./month 0.20 0.043 **   0.05
Present exp. on piped water 0.020 15 0.30 0.013 **   0.07
Exp. in water from coping sources 0.004 32.7 L./month 0.12 0.013 **   0.07
Time spent fetching water  0.000 190 Mins/month 0.06 0.116       0.01
Frequency of water service  % Weighted B
1 = (daily) -0.671 0.268 -0.18
1 = (not daily) 0.398 0.732 0.29
Weighted coefficient:  0.11 0.009 ** * -0.08
Wealth (artefact) index 0.000 6856 Index 0.00 0.026 **   0.06
Years of education 0.061 6.3 Years 0.38 0.011 **   0.07
Administration  SANAA -0.682 -0.68 0.000 ** * -0.13
Administration  Municipal -0.519 -0.52 0.011 **   -0.07
Administration Patronato 0.839 0.84 0.000 ** * 0.15
Administration  Junta de Agua 0.362 0.36 0.054 *     0.05
Constant 0.539 0.88 0.000 ** *
Predictive capacity of the model Significance levels
Predicted 1% * ** V.High
Observed Accept Don’t accept % correct 5% * * High
Accept 246 77 76% 10% * Good
Don’t accept 97 180 65% > 10% Low
Overall 71%
Estimate of Willingness to Pay SANAA Municipal Patronato Junta Weighted average
ß 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058
a 1.04 1.20 2.56 2.08
Average, median WTP (=a/ß), Lps. 17.9 20.7 44.1 35.8 28.3
Positive integral of WTP, C', Lps.  23.1 25.2 45.3 37.9 31.8
Cases analyzed 230 110 155 106 601
Interpretation of the table
The statistic B reported in the first column of Table A1.1 indicates the direction and size of the impact of each
independent variable on the probability that a household will accept the improved system. When B = 0, the impact
is zero; when B is negative, the impact is negative; when B is positive, the impact is positive. Each of the variables
included in the model has the expected direction of impact. In both models, willingness to pay for an improved
service varies positively with household income, present expenditure on piped water, present expenditure on coping
sources (both in time and in money), wealth, and education. The variables which have a negative impact are: price
of the improved system and the frequency of the existing service (the better it is, the lower willingness to pay for
improvement). 
System administration has a clear impact. When the system administration is public (SANAA or municipal) the
probability of accepting any given price for an improved system is lower; however, within the public sector,
municipal administration reports significantly higher WTP than SANAA administration. When the system The R statistic measures the relative contribution of the different variables to changes in the probability of acceptance.
18
As well as taking account of the coefficients for the impact of changes in the independent variables, this statistic also takes account
of the ranges of values observed for each independent variable. The bigger R, in absolute terms, the more important is the variable
to the explanation of observed changes in the probability of accepting the improved system
 For a discussion of the empirical estimation of WTP from survey data, see Ardila (1993) and  McConnell (1995). The
19
estimates reported here use Ardila’s methodology for the econometric estimate of WTP, but is calculated using SPSS, not in
LIMDEP, and use McConnell’s methodology for the empirical distribution estimator.
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administration is private (via a Patronato or Junta de Agua), the probability of acceptance is much higher. This
effect is especially marked where the administrator is a Patronato.
All the variables included in each of the two models report significance levels of 10% or better, except for time
fetching water from coping sources in the linear model, whose significance is 11.6%. The inferential validity of the
reported impact for each variable is reported in the “Sig” column. Three stars indicate a probability that the
variable’s coefficient is really zero (i.e. the probability of a “type one” error) is under 1%, two stars, that it is under
5% and one star, under 10%. If there is no star, the data are not significant at the 10% level. The diagnostic
statistics also confirm that system administration has a relatively large impact, compared with the other independent
variables in the model.  The linear model successfully predicts 76% of yes answers and 65% of no answers, for an
18
average of 71%.
Willingness to Pay estimates
To concretize the impact of system administration on Willingness to Pay, estimates were made of the average WTP
for the improved system, in Lempiras per month, for each type of system administration. These estimates are
reported at the bottom of each table. The logistical function which was estimated has the form: P(yes) = 1/ 1+e . 
-z
The estimated coefficient z of the logistical function reflects the change in household utility ascribable to the
improvement in the system: z =?V = a - B A . In this expression, ?V is the compensated variation in household 1 1
utility. The constant term a represents the joint impact of all non-price variables on V;  A  is the cost of the 1
improved system (i.e. the reduction in income which the consumer must accept in order to get the improved system)
and B is a coefficient which reflects the marginal utility of income. The estimate is made on the basis of a 1 
representative household. For categorical variables, a weighted coefficient is calculated, based on the proportion of
households in each category. 
The value of a is then calculated by applying their respective B coefficients to the average value of each independent
variable encountered in the survey database (see column “Average Value”). The value of a for each type of supplier
has a series of common elements, associated with household income, expenditure on piped water, expenditure on
coping sources, time used fetching water, the frequency of the service, wealth, and years of education, totaling 1.17
(Table A 1.1) . 
But a also has an element particular to each type of system administration, which is negative for SANAA (-0.68)
and municipalities (-0.52), but positive for patronatos (0.84) and juntas de agua (0.36). This gives values a (reported
in the second line of the Estimate of Willingness to Pay at the bottom of table A 1.1) ranging from 1.04 for SANAA,
1.20 for municipal suppliers, 2.56 for patronatos and 2.08 for juntas de agua. Average and median WTP is then
calculated as a/ß, where ß, which is -1 times the B  coefficient for the price variable, is constant for all types of 1
administrator, at 0.058. The value of integral positive WTP is also reported; this is greater than the average as it
excludes the negative range of the area under the logistical curve, which crosses the vertical axis before probability
reaches unity.  
19
Additionally, a WTP estimate was made using an empirical distribution estimator, which is applied to the survey
data without assuming any functional form (table A1.2, on the next page). This estimation technique calculates the The differences between the four types of administration are smallest in the empirical estimation. This arises because
20
this form of estimation does not control for the impact of the other independent variables. Income and wealth (both positively
correlated with WTP) are higher among the SANAA and municipal clients than among the clients of the private systems
(predominantly in marginal barrios). This offsets the effect of system administration on WTP and, as a result,  the reported
difference in WTP is smaller than that reported in the econometric estimate.
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proportion of households whose reply falls in each price range, assigns to this group the average price of the range,
and calculates overall WTP as the resulting weighted average. For instance, in the case of SANAA clients, 44% fell
in the range zero to L.19, whose average price is L.9.5; 15% fell in the range L.20 to L.29 (average L.24.5); 11% in
the range L.30 to L.49 (average L.39.5), 8% in the range L.50 - L.59 (average L.54.5) and 22% in the range L.60 or
more (for this latter group the lower bound value of L.60 is assigned). Average WTP is them simply calculated by
the following sum:
WTP = 0.44*9.5 + 0.15*24.5 + 0.11*39.5 + 0.08*54.5 + 0.22*60 =L. 29.6
The results of these estimates are summarized in Table A1.3. Although the absolute value of WTP varies
considerably between the different forms of estimation, in each case, the analysis shows much higher willingness to
pay for an improved water service among the users of services run by Juntas de Agua and Patronatos in the
marginal barrios of Tegucigalpa, compared with both clients of SANAA and municipal clients. The results also
show that WTP is higher when the administration is municipal, than when it is SANAA.  These findings give
20
support to the hypotheses that:
C the credibility of municipally administered systems is somewhat higher than that of SANAA, and/or that
municipal clients’ expectation of capturing rents via lower tariffs is lower, compared with that of SANAA
clients. 
C However, the main difference is between the public and private suppliers. Private, community based
administration generally leads to higher willingness to pay for improved water services, presumably
because the perceived opportunities for rent-seeking are fewer. 
The obvious policy conclusion is that the municipalized water systems should wherever possible be managed by
enterprises, at arms-length from the local government, in order to discourage rent seeking activity by the systems’
clients, and that private management can be expected to contribute positively to the improvement in system
performance.44
Notes:
1. In ranges where the function Fj declines, the observations have been averaged to produce a monotonically increasing function. The survey
observations which have been averages are in italic with a grey backgound.
2. For a detailed explanation of the deriviation of the WTP estimates, see text.
Table A 1.3. Summary of willingness to pay estimates from different functional forms
Lps/month SANAA Municipal Patronato Junta de agua
Linear function (av. and median) 18.7 21.5 44.8 36.6
Empirical estimator (average) 29.6 34 42.5 39.7
Table A 1.2
Willingness to pay estimates using a Turnbull empirical distribution estimator
SANAA Clients
Price offered, L./ month L. / month 20 30 40 - 50 60 >60 40 50 Total
% of users who would vote in favor of the price % 56 41 30 22 n.a. 28 32
Probability that a household would accept  P (si) 0.56 0.41 0.30 0.22 0.00 0.28 0.32
Probability that a household would not accept Fj  0.44 0.59 0.70 0.78 1.00 0.72 0.68
Price range corresponding to the "no" answer C. 0 - 19 20 -29 30 - 49 50 - 59 >60 30 - 39 40 - 49
Average price in the range C. 10 25 40 55 60 35 45
Probability distribution function / 1 Pj = (Fj - Fj-1) 0.44 0.11 0.08 0.22 1.00 0.15
Estimate of average willingness to pay / 2 C. 4.2 3.7 4.2 4.5 13.0 29.6
Municipal clients
Price offered, L./ month L. / mes 20 30 40 50 - 60 >60 50 60 Total
% of users who would vote in favor of the price % 81 57 27 26 n.a. 24 28
Probability that a household would accept  P (si) 0.81 0.57 0.27 0.26 0.00 0.24 0.28
Probability that a household would not accept Fj  0.19 0.43 0.73 0.74 1.00 0.77 0.72
Price range corresponding to the "no" answer C. 0 - 19 20 -29 30 - 39 40 - 59 >60 40 - 49 50 - 59
Average price in the range C. 10 25 35 50 60 45 55
Probability distribution function / 1 Pj = (Fj - Fj-1) 0.19 0.24 0.30 0.01 0.26 1.00
Estimate of average willingness to pay / 2 C. 1.8 0.7 15.3 5.9 10.3 34.0
Patronato clients
Price offered, L./ month L. / mes 20 30 40 50 - 60 >60 50 60 Total
% of users who would vote in favor of the price % 91 86 46 37 n.a. 35 39
Probability that a household would accept  P (si) 0.91 0.86 0.46 0.37 0.00 0.35 0.39
Probability that a household would not accept Fj  0.10 0.14 0.54 0.63 1.00 0.65 0.61
Price range corresponding to the "no" answer C. 0 - 19 20 -29 30 - 39 40 - 59 >60 40 - 49 50 - 59
Average price in the range C. 10 25 35 50 60 45 55
Probability distribution function / 1 Pj = (Fj - Fj-1) 0.1 0.10 0.37 1.00 0.04 0.40
Estimate of average willingness to pay / 2 C. 0.9 4.7 22.1 1.0 13.8 42.5
Junta clients
Price offered, L./ month L. / mes 20 30 Total 20 - 30 40 50 60 >60
% of users who would vote in favor of the price % 64 79 71 60 33 26 n.a.
Probability that a household would accept  P (si) 0.64 0.79 1 0.60 0.33 0.26 0.00
Probability that a household would not accept Fj  0.36 0.21 0.29 0.40 0.67 0.74 1.00
Price range corresponding to the "no" answer C. 0 - 19 20 -29 0 - 29 30 - 39 40 - 49 50 - 59 >60
Average price in the range C. 10 25 15 35 45 55 60
Probability distribution function / 1 Pj = (Fj - Fj-1) 0.29 0.11 0.28 0.07 0.26 1.00
Estimate of average willingness to pay / 2 C. 4.3 3.8 12.2 3.7 15.6 39.7
Total
Price offered, L./ month L. / mes 20 30 40 50 60 >60 Total
% of users who would vote in favor of the price % 71 63 32 29 26 n.a.
Probability that a household would accept  P (si) 0.71 0.63 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.00
Probability that a household would not accept Fj  0.29 0.37 0.68 0.71 0.74 1.00
Price range corresponding to the "no" answer C. 0 - 19 20 -29 30 - 39 40 - 49 50 - 59 >60
Average price in the range C. 10 25 35 45 55 60
Probability distribution function / 1 Pj = (Fj - Fj-1) 0.29 0.08 0.32 0.03 0.03 0.26 1
Estimate of average willingness to pay / 2 C. 2.8 1.9 10.9 1.2 1.6 15.6 33.945
ANNEX 2
ASSUMPTIONS USED IN PROJECTED PERFORMANCE OF THE SANAA SYSTEM
Table A2.1. Assumptions used in the projected performance of the SANAA system (Table 13 in main text)
Baseline: no performance change Optimistic scenario Intermediate scenario
Current
income
Tariffs inflation during 1996 and the real tariff US$0.25)  per m  by 2005. (US$0.15) per m  in 2005.
Political constraints on tariff setting remain The new municipal managers gradually raise average tariffs Tariffs are increased gradually to
severe.  The 1995 tariff increase is eroded by to five times their 1994 level of US$0.05, reaching L.2.00 ( three times the 1994 level: L.1.2
remains at the 1994 level of L.0.4 (US$0.05)
per m  through the rest of the projection.
3
3  3
Coverage The system expands at 7% per year, just Connections increase at 8% per year, 1% ahead of urban Connections grow at 7.5% per year,
enough to keep abreast of urban population population growth, allowing urban water coverage to rise allowing urban coverage to rise to
growth. Coverage stagnates. from 83% of households in 1995 to 93% in 2005. 88% by 2005.
Unaccounted Unaccounted for water remains at 50%. Unaccounted for water is reduced from 50% to 25% over the Unaccounted for water is reduced





Employment  per 1,000 clients remains at The SANAA workforce is paid off and the municipal systems The SANAA workforce is paid off
around 12, while real wages remain stable, so establish workforces at the DIMA average of 5 per 1,000 and the municipal systems establish
that both the workforce and the real wage bill clients. Real wages are increased by 15%. The result is a 50% workforces at the DIMA average of
grow in line with the number of connections reduction in the wage bill in real terms. Thereafter, 5 per 1,000 clients. Real wages are
(7% per year). productivity growth of 2.5% per year allows a 8% annual increased by 15%. Thereafter, staff
increase in connections while staffing grows only 5.5% per grows  in line with the annual
year, permitting a steady further fall in employees per 1,000 increase  in connections; no
clients. productivity growth is supposed.




Investment The investment pipeline of $197 million as projected in Table 2.1, based on SANAA’s existing plans, is implemented equally in the three
scenarios. However, capital productivity varies. The investment cost per new connection is $1,600 in the baseline projection, $1,300 in the
optimistic scenario and $1,450 in the intermediate scenario, so that the growth of new connections is higher in the optimistic scenario. The high
cost per connection reflects the high costs of a new production system for Tegucigalpa when La Concepción is exhausted.
Debt interest Is fully charged to the system at the rate of 3.5% per year observed in 1990-94.









Not incurred. Estimated at L.107 mn,  assuming that the accounts collectable are written off.46
Table  A 2.2
Honduras - investment pipeline for water, SANAA systems
Millions of 1994 US Dollars 
Total Start  Years Real Est.
value of
of date execut 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
project ion
Accumulated net  160 197 214 233 227 243 259 275 290 305 297 290
financial investment
Continuing projects 87   41 22 24
New Projects
- New dam for
Tegucigalpa
110 1999 5 22 22 22 22 22
Total , new projects 110   0 0 0 22 22 22 22 22 0 0
Total  investment 197   41 22 24 0 22 22 22 22 22 0 0
Annual investment 1.32% 0.68% 0.72% 0.00% 0.62% 0.59% 0.57% 0.55% 0.54% 0.00% 0.00%
% of GDP
Source: our calculations based on
SECPLAN data
Note: this Program includes only investment in water projects within the SANAA
system For a discussion of the welfare gains which result from water metering, see Savedoff (1993).
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 Although the data for other municipalities would not be identical (due to different costs and different existing water
22
expenditures for households outside the system), the direction and order of magnitude of the effects analyzed here should be similar.
 Water demand in Tegucigalpa is overwhelmingly determined by the price and quality of the service (Walker and
23
Ordoñez, 1995). While other factors such as income, wealth, education, and sex of the respondent are significant independent
variables, their coefficients are relatively small. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that the water demand curve is similar for the
population sectors with and without a piped water system, in spite of the more advanced social condition of those with water
systems.
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ANNEX 3 THE WELFARE COSTS OF LOW LEVEL EQUILIBRIUM
This annex estimates the welfare gains to be had if the existing SANAA systems were to break out of the existing low
level equilibrium onto the growth path described in the “optimistic” scenario of table 13, compared with remaining in
the “baseline” scenario of stagnant coverage, high costs and low tariffs.
Increased coverage brings welfare gains for the households who previously had to get their water from alternative (more
expensive and / or lower quality) sources, while increased tariffs imply losses for the households who previously received
a service for less than marginal cost, and now have to pay more. However, to the extent that existing users are at present
being supplied with water at an opportunity cost which is higher than their marginal willingness to pay for it, the
reduction of their consumption will add to net social welfare. This is likely to happen if the increased tariff is
implemented through billing for metered consumption.   Data for Tegucigalpa from a 1995 household survey of water
21
demand, conducted by the authors (Walker and Ordoñez, 1995) allow us to determine the order of magnitude of these
welfare effects, confirming that the expected gains greatly outweigh the losses.  
22
a) Demand estimates
The demand estimate is based on survey data for the water consumption and expenditure of households without piped
water, and on SANAA estimates and survey data for the consumption and expenditure of households with piped water.
The analysis supposes that typical households with and without domestic connections have identical water demand
curves. The difference between them is that they face different prices, and therefore consume different quantities.
23
In March 1985, households without a SANAA connection, which purchased its water from a variety of private sources,
paid a weighted marginal price of  L.26 per cubic meter and consumed on average 3.7 cubic meters per month (table
A 3.1). Ideally, the demand estimate for SANAA’s existing clients should be based on the metered consumption of un-
rationed customers. However, no data are available for this variable. An approximation of the demand for this group
was made, on the basis of SANAA’s estimates for expected consumption coupled with survey data for expenditures of
SANAA users on additional water from complementary sources. This gives an estimated average monthly consumption
of 34 cubic meters, paying an average (weighted)  marginal price of  L.1.09 per meter. This should be regarded as an
approximation; however, the order of magnitude is reasonable, compared with data for water demand in other Central
American cities with similar income levels and climatic conditions.  This is equal to US$0.22 per cubic meter at the 1994 exchange rate of L.9 = US$1.00. This figure is not based on a
24
calculation of the system’s long run marginal cost (LRMC), rather, it arises from a projection of break-even income, and is likely
to be somewhat below LRMC, due to the relatively low financial cost of the existing (infra-marginal) connections. We use it here
in lieu of a reliable up to date estimate of LRMC. 
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Table A 3.1
Estimated demand curves for water in Tegucigalpa, based on survey data
A. Households without piped water Notes
Weighted marginal cost of water sources used, L./M3  (P1) 26.00
Average consumption, M3/month/household  (Q1) 3.7
B. Households with piped water and metered consumption
Water from SANAA 1
Marginal price of SANAA water L./M3 0.6
Average monthly household consumption of SANAA water, M3 33.3
Water from other sources
Weighted marginal cost of water used, L./M3  24.50
Average consumption, M3/month/household  0.690
Total
Weighted marginal price for water from all sources, L/M3 (P2) 1.09
Average consumption of water from all sources, M3/month (P2) 34.0
C. Coefficients of a linear demand curve 2
ALPHA 29.04
BETA -0.82
Point elasticity for households without piped water (P1,Q1) -8.54
Point elasticity for households with piped water (P2,Q2) -0.04
D. Coefficients for a logarithmic demand curve
Constant term, a 34.00
Elasticity for logarithmic function, e -0.68 3
Notes
1.  Data taken from SANAA commercial register for the marginal tariff 
and average household consumption of metered clients, in December 1995
2. The estimated curve is: P = ALPHA + BETA Q
e 3.  The estimated curve is: Q = aP
On the basis of these data, two demand curves were estimated: a linear curve and a logarithmic curve. The coefficients
of the curves are reported in table A 3.1; the diagram on the following page illustrates the two curves. The financial
analysis of the SANAA system, presented in Table 13 in the main text, showed that a five-fold increase of the average
tariff to L.2 per cubic meter (from the average of L0.4 per meter paid at present) would be sufficient to permit the system
to expand ahead of population growth and improve service quality for existing clients.  The diagram shows this change
24
in the form of a tariff of L.2.0 per cubic meter; it is assumed that the average and marginal tariff would be equalized.
The impact of this change on demand depends on which demand curve is used.  With a linear demand curve, point
elasticity is very low for existing clients (-0.04) but very high for households without piped water  (-8.54). The average
household facing a price of L.2 per cubic meter and an improved piped service (which obviates the need to use
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 The predicted expenditure of L.66 per month from the linear curve is 4% of average household income and that of L.43
25
per month from the logarithmic curve, is 2.8% of income. Average household income in March 1995 was estimated at L.1,511
(Walker and Ordoñez, 1995: 15).
 It is assumed that the existing price paid existing suppliers of water from coping sources  is a good reflection of the
26
social opportunity cost of the resources used to produce and distribute this water, and that these resources would be reassigned to
other socially useful purposes. It is also assumed that L.2 per meter will exactly cover  the opportunity cost of the water to be
supplied by SANAA to these new clients. As a result, both SANAA and the alternative suppliers to be displaced has a zero net
welfare change.
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elasticity of -0.68, so that the reduction in demand for the existing clients
is much sharper, while the increase in demand
for new clients is less. Each would consume 21.5 meters per month when
the price is L.2 per meter.
25
b) Welfare estimates 
On the basis of these data, the net annual welfare gains per household
from increasing urban water coverage were estimated, for each type of
demand curve (tables A 3.2 and A 3.3).  In each case, the gains are
distinct for existing SANAA clients and new clients. In the case of the
linear function, net welfare gain per new client incorporated in the
system is L.440 per month; the whole of this gain is received by the new
client.  For the existing clients, the net welfare gain is L.16 per month.
26
This is the sum of a net welfare loss for the consumer (who must now pay
the full cost of his water) and a net gain for SANAA (which previously
supplied the water below cost). With the logarithmic demand curve, the
net gain per new client is L.158 per month (reflecting lower per capita
consumption than that predicted by the linear curve) and the net gain per
existing client is L.36 per month (reflecting a greater reduction in uneconomic consumption by existing users).
Table A 3.4 summarizes the total welfare impacts predicted from the two demand functions. The global welfare impact
would depend on the number of households who would have water if coverage does not expand, and the number who
will enter the system as the result of the expansion. If urban coverage in the existing SANAA systems were be increased
to 93% by 2005 (as per the optimistic scenario in table 13 of the main text), an estimated 29,000 households would
benefit. If coverage had stagnated at 83%, there would have been 243,000 households with coverage. The total net
annual welfare gain is estimated at L.201 millions on the basis of the linear demand curve and L.160 millions on the
basis of the logarithmic curve. The annual net welfare gain is estimated at 0.7% and 0.6% of 1994 GDP, respectively.
The reform of the sector aims to produce a transformation of the performance of all the urban water systems of Honduras
- not just those run at present by SANAA. The municipal systems, which account for 65% of urban connections, exhibit
similar weaknesses to those of SANAA. If reform were to produce similar improvements in all the urban systems, then
the welfare gains would be much greater than those described in the preceding paragraph, amounting to 2.1% of GDP
per year on the basis of the linear demand estimate and 1.6% using the logarithmic function (table A 3.4).50
Table A 3.2
Welfare analysis of increased water coverage in Tegucigalpa - linear demand function
Without project With project Change Notes
A New consumers
I Private consumers
Consumption, M3 / month 3.7 33 29.3
 - SANAA 0 33 33
 - Other source 3.7 0 -3.7
Expenditure, L./month 96.2 66 -30.2
 - SANAA 0 66 66
 - Other source 96.2 0 -96.2
Gross Welfare 101.75 511.35 409.6
Tariff paid 96.2 66 -30.2
Net welfare 5.55 445.35 439.8
II SANAA
Total cost (= social opportunity cost) 0 66 66
Income 0 66 66
Net gain 0 0 0
III Employees and suppliers 96.2 66 -30.2
 - Of SANAA 0 66 66
 - Of other sources 96.2 0 -96.2
B Existing SANAA clients
I Private consumers
Consumption, M3 / month 34 33 -1
 - SANAA 33.3 33 -0.3
 - Other source 0.7 0 -0.7
Expenditure, L./month 30.8 66 35.2
 - SANAA 13.9 66 52.1
 - Other source 16.9 0 -16.9
Gross Welfare 512.85 511.35 -1.5
Tariff paid 30.8 66 35.2
Net welfare 482.05 445.35 -36.7
II SANAA
Total cost (= social opportunity cost) 66.6 66 -0.6
Income 13.9 66 52.1
Net gain -52.7 0 52.7
III Employees and suppliers 83.5 66 -17.5
 - Of SANAA 66.6 66 -0.6
 - Of other sources 16.9 0 -16.9
C SUMMARY New consumers Existing SANAA clients
Change in gross welfare 409.6 -1.5
SANAA gain 0 52.7
Consumer gain 439.8 -36.7
Worker / supplier gain -30.2 -17.5
Change in net welfare 439.8 16 1
Consumer gain 439.8 -36.7
SANAA gain 0 52.7  
Worker / supplier gain 0 0 2
Notes
1 Net welfare = Gross welfare - Social opportunity cost.
2 Supposing all inputs are paid their social opportunity cost51
Table A 3.3
Welfare analysis of increased water coverage in Tegucigalpa - logarithmic demand curve
Without project With project Change Notes
A NEW CONSUMERS
I Private consumers
Consumption, M3 / month 3.7 21.5 17.8
 - SANAA 0 21.5 21.5
 - Other source 3.7 0 -3.7
Expenditure, L./month 96.2 43 -53.2
 - SANAA 0 43 43





Total cost (= social opportunity cost) 0 43 43
Income 0 43 43
Net gain 0 0 0
III Employees and suppliers 96.2 43 -53.2
 - Of SANAA 0 43 43
 - Of other sources 96.2 0 -96.2
B EXISTING SANAA CLIENTS
I Private consumers
Consumption, M3 / month 34 21.5 -12.5
 - SANAA 33.3 -11.8 21.5
 - Other source 0.7 -0.7 0
Expenditure, L./month 30.8 43 12.2
 - SANAA 13.9 29.1 43





Total cost (= social opportunity cost) 66.6 43 -23.6
Income 13.9 43 29.1
Net gain -52.7 0 52.7
III Employees and suppliers 83.5 43 -40.5
 - Of SANAA 66.6 43 -23.6
 - Of other sources 16.9 0 -16.9
C SUMMARY New consumers Existing SANAA clients
Change in gross welfare 104.7 -4.8
SANAA gain 0 52.7
Consumer gain 157.9 -17.0
Worker / supplier gain -53.2 -40.5
Change in net welfare 158 36 1
Consumer gain 158 -17.0
SANAA gain 0 52.7  
Worker / supplier gain 0 0 2
Notes
1 Net welfare = Gross welfare - Social opportunity cost.
2 Supposing all inputs are paid their social opportunity cost52
Table A 3.4
Estimates of the welfare impact of  rasing tariffs to L.2 per cubic meter and increasing coverage in urban systems to 93% by 2005
Net monthly welfare gain per Number of house-holds Total net annual welfare gain
household  in 2005 /1
1994 Lempiras Consumer Producer Net gain per SANAA All urban SANAA systems All urban systems
gain gain household systems systems
Lempiras Thousands Millions of % of Millions of % of
Lempiras 1994 Lempiras 1994
GDP GDP
a. Linear demand curve
Households which would have -37 53 16 243 701 47 0.2% 135 0.5%
water with 83% coverage
Households which have water due 440 0 440 29 84 154 0.6% 446 1.6%
to expansion of coverage to 93%
Total households with water 272 786 201 0.7% 581 2.1%
b. Logarithmic demand function
Households which would have -17 53 36 243 701 104 0.4% 300 1.1%
water with 83% coverage
Households which have water due 158 0 158 29 84 55 0.2% 160 0.6%
to expansion of coverage to 93%
Total households with water 272 786 160 0.6% 461 1.6%
Source: Our estimates, based on survey data. See text for explanation and Annex 3 for detailed benefit calculations.
Notes: 1/ Assumes 7% p.a. urban population growth 1993-2005 (extrapolated from 1988-1993)
Population projection used in welfare estimates:
Parameters 1993 2005 (A) 2005 (B) Difference
SANAA urban connections 142,000 272,129 242,868 29,261
Proportion of population covered 83% 93% 83%
Number of persons covered (5 * conn) 5 710,000 1,360,647 1,214,341 146,306
Population (rate of growth 7%) 5% 855,422 1,463,061 1,463,061
All urban connections 410,000 785,726 701,239 84,487
Proportion of population covered 83% 93% 83%
Number of persons covered (5 * conn) 5 2,050,000 3,928,629 3,506,196 422,433
Population (rate of growth 7%) 5% 2,469,880 4,224,332 4,224,332